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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
The NGO-donor relationship is exceptionally volatile. NGOs, particularly in developing 
countries, rely heavily on donor funding. Resource dependence has directed NGOs to 
adjust their objectives to fit with donor priorities. Fluctuating preferences of donors lead 
NGOs to shift their behavior and respond to the objectives of the donor rather than the 
beneficiaries of the local community. Many NGOs in developing countries modify their 
activities and target groups to attain or sustain financial resources. One major 
consequence of this is that NGOs’ behavioral shift may have disconnected them from 
their constituents. Hence, aid allocated to recipient NGOs in developing countries may 
not be efficient in generating development in local communities. It is important to note 
that this research is not an evaluation of whether NGOs are ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The study is 
about the relationship between NGOs and donor agencies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIAL…………………………….….….……….. 8 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION……………………………….…………….…….… 9 
BACKGROUND…………………………………………………………………….… 10 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM………………………………………..……………...... 12 
THE RESEACH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS…………………...……………… 13 
THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES……………………………………………………… 14 
METHODOLOGY……………………………………………………………….……...14 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS……………………………………………………….. 17 
 
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK..19 
LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………………………………………. 20 
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY………………………………………………. 24 
THE RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE…………………………..………. 26 
NGOS AND RESOURCES…………………………………………………………….. 28 
POWER RELATIONS…………………………………………………….…………… 30 
THE DEPENDENCY TRAP…………………………………………..………….……. 33 
UNCERTAINTY IN THE RELATIONSHIP………………………………………….. 34 
EXPLAINING NGO BEHAVIOR…………………………………………...………… 37 
 
CHAPTER III: UNDERSTANDING NGO BEHAVIOR…………….....…...…….. 42 
 8 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATES AND NGOS…………………..…………….. 43 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DONORS AND NGOS………………..………………. 44 
THE QUESTION OF PARTNERSHIP……………………………….......……………. 46 
SHIFTS IN BEHAVIOR: DONOR PRIORITIES VS. COMMUNITY BASED 
ASSESSMENT ………………………………………………………………………… 49 
 
CHAPTER IV: CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE NGO SCENE IN EGYPT…..52 
THE NATURE OF EGYPT’S NGO COMMUNITY………………………………….. 53 
FOREIGN FUNDING IN EGYPT AFTER 2011………………………………….…... 55 
SHIFTS IN INETERESTS AND SPECIALIZATION………………………………… 58 
 
CHAPTER V: CASE STUDY……………………….……………...…….………….. 62 
CASE PROFILE………………………………………………………………….…….. 63 
FINDINGS…………………………………………………………………..………….. 70 
REFLECTION AND ANAYLSIS………………………………………...……………. 73 
  
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION………………………………….………...………… 81 
RECOMMENDATIONS……………………………………………………..………… 85 
LIMITATIONS…………………………………………………………………………. 86 
  
 
 
 
 9 
APPENDIX A: Training Certificate……………………………………...………….. 87 
APPENDIX B: Project Proposal (NED)…………………………………………...… 88 
APPENDIX C: Project Proposal (UNDEF)………………………………………..… 95 
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………..………… 111 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIALS 
 
 
Figure 1: Resource Dependence Theory……………………………...………………… 25 
 
Figure 2: Hirschman’s Model of Explaining Behavior…………………...…………….. 38 
 
Figure 3: AHFHR’s Organizational Structure……………………………………..…… 66 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of AHFHR’s Case Profile………………………………………….. 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
As development actors, NGOs (Non-governmental organizations) have become 
the major service provider in states where the government is unable to fulfill its 
role in specific areas. NGOs are increasingly becoming a significant force. They 
are claimed to be effective, independent, flexible, and responsive to the least 
privileged in society. The past two decades in particular have marked a wave of a 
huge growth in the number of NGOs. Consequently, the role of NGOs in almost 
every society has been rising which led them to form a strong distinctive sector, 
which is composed of civil society organizations. NGOs have developed into 
crucial actors engaged in key aspects of social life; such as health, education, 
environmental issues, gender issues, development, and human rights. (Bagci, 
2003). 
 
NGOs operate by raising finances from governments, private sources, or donor 
agencies. According to statistics, international donor agencies form the 
fundamental financial contributor to NGOs. (Bagci, 2003).  The amount of funds 
and the decision of who gets funded are in the hands of the donor agency. NGOs, 
particularly in developing countries, heavily rely on foreign donors for funds. 
Donor dominance is clearly evident. (AbouAssi, 2012). Thus, NGOs find 
themselves trying to fit their organizational procedures and operations to donors’ 
priorities. The question that poses itself is to what extent do donors influence the 
decision making of NGOS? 
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Throughout the past decade, most NGOs as well as donor agencies have 
perceived the important link between human rights and development. It has even 
been noticed that both concepts go hand in hand. Human rights and development 
have become tightly linked. Their shared objective being the improvement of 
human well-being is based on a belief in the inherent dignity and equality of all 
people. (HRBA Portal). The gravest human rights concerns that have been 
ongoing for years are poverty and inequality. (UNDP, Human Development 
Report). In fact, development cannot be isolated from those concerns. 
 
With the world witnessing so many human rights violations, the importance of 
NGOs became even more significant. However, NGOs still find themselves 
unable to be efficient and effective forces in the fight against human rights abuse. 
A major reason why NGOs cannot fulfill this task is due to funding problems. 
Because of the difficulty of being chosen by the donor agency, NGOs started 
adjusting their projects in ways that fit with the priorities of the donors. 
Consequently, NGOs started drifting from a focus on community needs to 
becoming a service delivery agent. 
 
Donor dominance is especially evident in NGOs in developing countries. The aim 
of this study is to examine the NGO-donor relationship in developing countries 
and apply it to the particular context of Egyptian civil society, as Egypt is 
considered one of the developing countries that features both a growing number 
of NGOs as well as a rising number of human rights violations. This examination 
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draws on qualitative research that will be achieved through evaluating the 
behavior of NGOs, which were originally established as a tool for fighting and 
reducing, if not eliminating, human rights violations. 
 
1.2. The Research Problem 
Most of the non-governmental organizations in Egypt (NGOs) have emerged in 
response to the increasing human rights violations in the country. Despite 
different ideologies and priorities, an immense number of NGOs supposedly have 
the common goal of eradicating gross human rights abuses. However, even 
though the number of NGOs fighting human rights abuse has significantly 
increased, the reported incidents of human rights abuse have risen drastically. 
 
The purpose of this research is to understand why NGOs adopt perspectives and 
priorities derived from funding sources. Understanding NGOs’ organizational 
practice and performance is crucial to any explanation of their inability to 
completely fulfill their declared purpose. Hence, this study entails an examination 
of the structure and functioning of the organizations.  
 
The influence of donors on NGOs is an explanatory factor in understanding why 
NGOs function as they do and why they select their project issues in a specific 
order. While donors set their funding priorities, NGOs find themselves in a 
situation where they have to adapt. The remarkable growth of NGOs over the last 
decade would not have been possible without the financial contributions of 
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donors. In the case of Egypt, the major source of development financial aid 
delivery to NGOs comes from international donors. This reality tends to drive 
NGOs to formulate their policies and projects in ways that fit donors’ priorities.  
 
International donors come from different cultures and face different problems 
than the ones faced by communities in developing countries. Therefore, some 
problems that could be significant to developing countries are not on the list of 
donors’ priorities because the donor simply has other objectives. With the 
government doing very little help to strengthen and support NGOs, those 
organizations are obliged to shift their behavior and objectives to fit donor 
priorities in order to continue surviving. 
 
1.3. The Research Question and Hypothesis 
1.3.1. Research Question 
What is the significance of donor conditionality in impacting the behavior 
of a resource-dependent NGO? 
 
1.3.2. Sub-Questions 
 To what extent does resource dependence theory help explain today’s 
relationships between NGOs and donors? 
 Why are international donors the major contributors of NGO funding 
rather than state agencies?  
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 What impact does donors’ decision to change their funding priorities have 
on NGO’s established priorities? 
 
1.3.3. Hypothesis 
Despite Egyptian NGO’s sincere attempt to serve beneficiaries, NGOs’ reliance 
on foreign resources has resulted in their shifting established priorities to align 
with donor interests. 
 
1.4. The Research Objective   
The objective of this research is to address the central research question. There are 
three major goals in addressing this question. The first goal is to apprehend the 
shift in NGOs projects based on a change in donor’s priority areas through a 
comprehensive conceptual framework. The second goal is to provide a better 
understanding to NGOs behavior and decisions. Finally, the third goal is to 
identify and analyze the most obvious developmental problems that occur in 
society due to NGOs responding to the donors rather than to the people in the 
community. 
 
1.5. Methodology 
This study is a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of 
Arts. A qualitative research methodology is used for this study. Michael Patton 
defined qualitative research as attempting to understand the unique interactions in 
a specific situation. (Patton, 1996). The purpose of understanding is not 
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necessarily to predict what may occur, but rather to comprehend the situation. 
Therefore, this study attempts to identify and explain essential elements of the 
relationship between foreign donors in Egypt, and by extension, NGOs in 
developing countries. The test of the hypothesis is attributed to a combination of 
factors. The two main factors that constitute a test to the hypothesis are: the 
impact of donors on NGOs shifting priorities and the extent of the significance of 
the shift in priorities. 
 
Throughout this study, I used a combination of various research techniques for 
data collection and analysis in order to examine the aforementioned factors. The 
following outlines these techniques. 
 
1.5.1. Observation 
My study is initially based on a time I spent in a human rights organization in 
Cairo. Throughout my training there, I observed how actual decisions were being 
taken and how priorities were being formulated. I attended formal as well as 
informal meetings, which allowed me to form a concrete idea about the 
importance of funding in the creation of future projects. It is important to note that 
my reliance on this particular case study aims at touching on a reality extending 
far beyond the Egyptian context. What I have witnessed during my internship led 
me to start my research study on NGOs in developing countries.  
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This NGO, in particular, did not undergo a paradigm shift, which affects the test 
of my hypothesis. However, the changes that the NGO has implemented in 
priority areas according to donor preferences- even though under the same title of 
human rights- prove to be evidently significant. Furthermore, this NGO was 
initially based on personal funding. The moment the NGO turned to foreign 
donors is the moment where everything changed. Instead of committing to their 
initial projects and beneficiaries, this case illustrates how the need of resource 
eventually leads most NGOs to not only to turn to donors, but more importantly to 
prioritize donor interests. The knowledge I gained throughout this process gave 
me solid evidence that will help me answer my research question. 
 
1.5.2. Documentary Analysis 
I have done an extensive research through books, articles, and United Nations 
publications on the concept and practice of NGO-donor relationship. In this 
research, I focused on a document analysis procedure in the context of the study. 
The nature and form of publications involved in this research outlines the 
advantages and limitations of document analysis. The research documents are rich 
in terms of theories, approaches, and understanding behaviors. However, it is 
scarce in documents about NGO practice because NGOs are not explicit about 
their shifting behaviors. The application of document analysis to a grounded 
theory study is illustrated. 
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The aforementioned primary and secondary sources allowed me to collect the 
information I need to reach a reasonable conclusion to my research. Gathering 
information, participation and observation are all fundamental and highly 
important methods in all qualitative inquiry.  
 
Despite problems and limitation with data resources, I was able to collect 
different kinds of data resources such as books, articles, and other documents 
from different resources along the previous period. These data are reasonable in 
light of the evidence and the aims of the study. Analyzing these documents and 
materials in a scientific way, makes it more reliable and credible. Finally, 
accuracy in a study comes from the validity of the research, the reliability of the 
findings, and the use of triangulation in data collection. Therefore, to address the 
accuracy of the analysis, transparency in presenting the data is always ensured. 
 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
The Structure of the thesis is as follows; the first chapter serves as an introduction 
to the topic of this study, specifically clarifying the research problem, as well as 
the proposed hypothesis, the research objectives, the methodology underlying this 
research and the structure of the upcoming thesis chapters. The second chapter 
provides a review of the relevant scholarly literature and illustrates the conceptual 
framework of this study. It explains the Resource Dependence Theory, and its 
 19 
importance for understanding NGO behavior. The chapter illuminates two 
important concepts that will further illustrate the relationship between NGOs and 
donors. Those two concepts are: the Dependency Trap and Power Relations. This 
chapter, furthermore, attempts to explain NGO behavior through Hirschman’s 
theory of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. The third chapter introduces the nature of the 
NGO-Donor relationship. The first part in this chapter discusses the NGOs’ 
funding options and illustrates why most NGOs ultimately resort to international 
donors. The second part of this chapter explains NGOs’ reactions to donors’ 
decision to change their funding priorities. The particular focus of this chapter is 
to demonstrate how the shift from community-based assessment to donor 
priorities can impede the development of a society rather than enhance it. Chapter 
four is a contextualization of the NGO scene in Egypt. It focuses on the years post 
the 25 January revolution. This overall mapping illustrates the nature of Egyptian 
NGOs, the significance of foreign funding, and the areas of interests and 
specialization. The fifth chapter evaluates the work of NGOs in Egypt. The Arab 
House Foundation for Human rights is used as a case study to evaluate the shift in 
projects in the recent years. This chapter illustrates findings and explains how the 
shift in NGO projects has been a response to the donor rather than to the Egyptian 
community. The sixth chapter is the concluding chapter.  It highlights all the 
major points tackled in this research. Furthermore, it provides recommendations 
for overcoming the volatile relationship between NGOs and donors. Finally, the 
limitations of this research will be addressed.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Literature Review   
 
2.1.1. The nature of NGOs-donor relationship 
One of the particularities of development is the reliance on international donors 
for policies and funding. Development administrators in developing countries, 
including NGOs, face a critical dilemma. They must maintain a consistent stance 
on values that emphasize self- determination, empowerment, and an equitable 
distribution of benefits, while also acting to fulfill the political agendas of donors 
who act according to their own national interests. (Hook, 1995; Brinkerhoff and 
Coston, 1999; Martens, 2008). This dilemma dominates the NGO- donor 
relationships. 
It is hard to make generalizations about the nature of the relationship between 
donors and their recipient local partner organizations. NGOs play many roles in 
the relationship, such as implementers of donors’ policies and programs, catalysts 
of change in their respective communities, and partners in the development 
process and aid industry. (AbouAssi, 2012). Although the degree of agency and 
autonomy varies among these categories, donors usually dominate the 
relationship.  
The supply-led approach is the most dominant in the donor-NGOs relationship 
rather than the demand-led one. Donors have interests to accommodate besides 
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those of their beneficiaries (Martens, 2008). In the realist perspective on foreign 
assistance, precedence is given to the donor’s national interests. Development 
assistance and aid policies are seen as tools for implementing the foreign policies 
of donor countries. In their study on who gives to whom and for what, Alesina 
and Dollar (2000: 55) confirm that aid allocations are “very effective at promoting 
strategic interests of donors”.  
On the receiver end, NGOs are compelled to dramatically transform their 
operation and organizational cultures to the extent that they lose much of their 
local identity, as well as their affinity with constituents. In developing countries, 
“donors develop their programs, preferences and priorities and revise them at an 
ever-increasing pace, while (at best) NGOs try to figure out how they might fit in 
or if they meet the criteria underlying the latest preoccupation of donors”. 
(Doornbos, 2003: 15).  
There is a high conditionality of grants in terms of targeted (and excluded) 
beneficiaries and locales and types of services to be delivered or brands of 
products purchased (Basombrío, 2000; Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999; Chambers 
and Pettit, 2004). Thus, the most critical consequence is that as the NGO adjusts 
and conforms to the agendas, expectations, and interests of donors, it loses touch 
with both its mission and constituency. Froelich (1999) defines this practice as 
goal displacement, which “occurs when goals and activities are modified to 
satisfy the wishes of contributors” (250).  
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When an NGO shifts its programs to appeal to and appease the donor’s appetite, 
its role and practices are “determined by donor fashion and demands according to 
ideas and designs imposed and imported from outside”. (Edwards, Hulme and 
Wallace, 1999: 130). Despite an NGO’s candid emphasis on or attempt to serve 
beneficiaries, NGOs’ reliance on foreign resources shifts their sights and priorities 
to align with donor interests. (Chambers and Pettit, 2004). 
 
2.1.2. Donor priorities vs. community needs allocation 
Several studies argue that the targeting of official donors to needy recipient 
countries with reasonably good local conditions (in terms of basic institutions and 
economic policies) is far from perfect. The needs-based allocation of NGOs may 
be distorted by selfish donor motives. Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that 
bilateral partnership was dictated as much by political and strategic motives of 
donors as by need and local conditions in recipient countries. More recently, 
Berthélemy (2006) still labels various donors “egoistic”, rather than selfless.  
In several respects, NGOs may provide better-targeted aid than official donors. 
Most obviously perhaps is that the allocation of NGO aid should be less distorted 
by commercial and political interests of donor governments. The poverty focus of 
NGO aid may also be stronger than that of donors’; NGOs may be better in 
reaching the poor by avoiding governments in the recipient country and dealing 
directly with local target groups (Riddell et al., 1995). Moreover, after the World 
Bank posited in the late 1990s that government-to-government transfers do not 
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work when governance is particularly bad in the recipient country, it was 
sometimes argued that NGOs have comparative advantage of working in difficult 
environments (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). 
Arguably, it depends on the degree of financial autonomy whether or not aid 
allocation by NGOs differs from that of state agencies. While NGOs suggest 
autonomy from government organizations, NGOs are often intimately connected 
with their home governments. However, the dependence of many NGOs on 
funding is expected to shape their aid allocation. To the extent that they follow 
their official donors, their aid allocation would no longer be superior in terms of 
targeting the needy and deserving. More specifically, with future funding from 
official donors at risk, financially dependent NGOs can be expected to allocate 
aid strategically, e.g., by targeting less poor communities where success is easier 
to achieve (Koch et al., 2007). In other words, NGOs may be tempted to improve 
the chances of continued official refinancing by demonstrating visible results that 
tend to be easier to achieve with projects addressing less entrenched forms of 
poverty. Hence, NGOs start working on development goals that may not be 
crucial to the citizens of the country. 
 
The first section of this chapter discussed the literature review. The following 
section of the chapter presents the conceptual framework that is going to be 
employed in the qualitative study. 
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2.2. Resource Dependency Theory 
 
Organizational theories consider organizations to be open systems. (Scott, 1987). 
William R. Scott defined an organization as a “coalition of shifting interest groups 
that develop goals by negotiation [...] influenced by environmental factors”. 
(Scott, 1987: 23). Thus, organizational decisions and behaviors are rooted in the 
surrounding environment. (AbouAssi, 2012). Scholars who worked on the 
Resource Dependence Theory emphasize that “to understand the behavior of an 
organization, you must understand the context of the behavior”. (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978: 1). Hence, understanding organizational practice requires 
concentrating on organizations’ interactions with the external environment. 
(Thompson, 1967). 
Resource Dependence Theory argues that organizations are resource-insufficient. 
Their major challenge is to obtain and sustain resources from their external 
environment. (AbouAssi, 2012). Since actors from the external environment 
control resources, they perceive certain advantage in their relationship with the 
organization. They exercise power through their control over resources by 
exerting demands on organizations. The heavier the dependence of the 
organization on external actors for resources, the more powerful the actors are and 
the more influential their demands on organizations become in exchange for 
resources. (AbouAssi, 2012). 
For the organization, the major challenge is to find a way where it can effectively 
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respond to external demands while simultaneously not compromising its existing 
objectives. However, in reality, this challenge rapidly becomes paramount, and 
not merely “major”. (Oliver, 1991). Organizations, then, become coalitions 
protecting external demands by “altering purposes and domains to accommodate 
new interests, sloughing off parts of themselves to avoid some interests, and when 
necessary, becoming involved in activities far afield from their stated central 
purposes”. (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 24). 
Scholars studying organizational behavior developed three dimensions that 
determine the degree of dependence of organizations on external resources. The 
three dimensions (as exhibited in figure 1) are: criticality, concentration, and 
discretion. (Cho and Gillespie, 2006: 495). 
 
Figure 1: Resource Dependence Theory 
 
Criticality 
Concentration Discretion
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The first dimension is criticality or, in other words, the importance of resources. 
This dimension measures the criticality of the input or output of the organization. 
(Cho and Gillespie, 2006). The level of dependency in this dimension is expressed 
by how much the organization needs external resources for not only its 
operations, but also, and more importantly, for its survival. 
The second dimension is the concentration of resources. The availability of other 
sources in the external environment for the same resources is crucial in measuring 
the dependency of the organization. The organization’s autonomy increases and 
dependence upon external actors decreases when there is availability of 
alternative resources. (Cho and Gillespie, 2006). 
The third dimension is external actors’ discretion over resource allocation and 
use. Who gets what is completely in the hands of external actors. All questions 
about the possession of resources, access to resources, actual use of resources, and 
ability to regulate the employment of resources is a choice made by the external 
actor. (Cho and Gillespie, 2006). 
 
2.3. The Resource Dependence Perspective 
The importance of the Resource Dependency Theory was not formalized until the 
1970s. When Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik published “The External 
Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective” (1978).  This 
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book was necessary as it enabled scholars to understand the behavior of 
organizations through understanding the environments in which they are 
embedded. The Resource Dependence Perspective holds that in order to survive, 
organizations need to acquire and maintain resources through interacting with 
external actors. These interactions shape their activities and eventually lead to 
different outcomes. (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In environments where 
resources are abundant, the interdependence between organizations and external 
actors are minimal. However, in environments where resources are scarce, 
organizations’ survival are challenged due to their strong dependence on external 
actors for resources. 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), organizations are dependent on 
external actors for the exchange of financial and physical resources, information, 
or social legitimacy. In return, external actors have demands that can conflict with 
the organizations’ goals. In order to satisfy these demands, organizations find 
themselves in a vulnerable situation, which may be at the expense of their initial 
goals. Organizations, hence, become dependent on external actors in order to 
operate.  
According to this perspective, organizations measure the level of dependence and 
consider it during decision-making. Furthermore, individuals within organizations 
are considered rational actors who weigh the cost and benefits of choices to 
maximize their own benefits, which accordingly shape their behavior. (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978: 52).  
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2.4. NGOs and Resources 
Judith R. Saidel (2000) defines the resources that nonprofits need as “anything of 
value, tangible or intangible that can be exchanged between organizations”. 
(Saidel, 2000: 381). As an illustration, Saidel identifies the exchange of resources 
in the relationship between government and Non-Governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in terms of those provided by government, such as revenues, information, 
and access to policy processes, and those controlled by NGOs, such as service-
delivery capacity, political support, and legitimacy (Saidel, 2000: 381).  
Alnoor Ebrahim (2005b) distinguishes among resources exchanged in the donor- 
recipient relationship. He suggests that this ‘capital exchange’ can be of two 
forms: economic material resources such as money, property, and infrastructure, 
and symbolic non-material resources including authority, technical advice and 
expertise, reputation, information, and connections (Ebrahim, 2005a: 52). 
Exchange of resources between organizations is characterized by 
interdependence; one organization’s output is another organization’s input. An 
organization cannot produce its output unless and/or until another organization 
generates its own. Thus, interdependence transpires by behavior. In such a 
situation, the activities of one organization depend on those of another. That is 
“why nothing comes out the way one wants it to”. (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 
40). Interdependence moderates the steepness of dependence that characterizes an 
NGO’s relationship with a single funder. (Saidel, 2000). Accordingly, 
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organizations try to manage their resource dependence through the creation of 
interdependencies “which involve the exchange of resources rather than a flow 
that is predominantly in one direction”. (Ebrahim, 2005b: 60). Nevertheless, 
although the motive is to reduce uncertainty, interdependence may create 
additional uncertainty and unpredictability, restructure relations but sustain power 
imbalances, and increase control issues between organizations. 
An NGO, normally, balances its internal revenues with external funding, 
diversifies external sources, and avoids concentrating the flow of funding from a 
specific source. To illustrate, an NGO with diversified external funding source is 
in a better position to respond to and balance external demands, especially when 
the demands are different. (AbouAssi, 2012). If one source alters conditions for 
funding, an NGO can fend off the pressure to comply by relying on other sources 
that are more resilient, including its internal revenues. An NGO can also 
sequentially attend to the demands of various funders, which allows the 
organization to positively respond to what suits its interests and defer other 
demands until further developments occur. An NGO can explicitly play one donor 
off against another or benefit from available information to strengthen its position 
and influence or moderate donor demands. On the other hand, as NGO 
dependence on resources increases, the ability of donors to constrain the 
organization’s behavior increases, while the ability of the organization to buffer 
external demands decreases. In such a case, an NGO does not enjoy many options 
to respond to changes in funding conditions. The NGO complies with donor 
interests, whether immediately when the donor monopolizes the resource 
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environment of the NGO or eventually when the NGO realizes its limited ability 
to find an alternative route. In such a case, adjustment becomes a haven from 
excessive control and a strategy to buffer and moderately appeal to donors’ 
demands and ensure the continuity of funding. (AbouAssi, 2012).  
Resource Dependence Theory indicates that the organization can comply, adapt, 
manage, or attempt to manipulate and alter its resource environment. It needs to 
assess the anticipated repercussions of non-compliance with external demands, 
the cost of abandoning the available resources and securing others, and the degree 
of conflict between the various demands of actors on whom the organization is 
dependent. (Oliver, 1990). 
 
2.5. Power relations 
 
Organizational theory accounts for the changes that are occurring in NGOs in 
developing countries due to their unbalanced power relationships with funding 
organizations. According to neoinstitutional theorists DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms lead to isomorphism, 
which means greater similarities between organizations. Coercive isomorphism is 
a result of formal and informal pressure between organizations as well as cultural 
societal expectations. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that the more 
dependent an organization is on its exchange partners, the more this leads to 
greater similarities between organizations. Therefore, according to this 
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perspective, one could expect that formal and informal pressures would easily 
influence dependent organizations; causing them gradually to become more 
similar to influential organizations as they adopt legitimating forms and practices. 
(Rauh, 2010). 
Wallace, Bornstein and Chapman (2006) argue that the relationship between 
NGOs in developing countries and international donors is explained through the 
concepts of coercion and compliance. Donor agencies control funding and 
therefore are in a position of power. These donors set the agenda and conditions 
required for receiving a grant. (Markowitz and Tice, 2002; Henderson, 2002). 
According to Wallace et al. (2006), this coercion goes hand in hand with the 
dependent organization’s consent to the conditions on funding. Because donors 
have control over the funding and can decide to withdraw their contribution, 
coercion may include force (Wallace et al., 2006). However, it is often a result of 
the acceptance of norms that are rarely questioned or challenged because they are 
seen as the standardized or “correct” way to do development work (Wallace et al., 
2006). In other words, coercion may be direct or indirect through the adoption of 
norms held within the NGO. 
 
Donors are in a position of power since they control resources on which NGOs’ 
depend. Consequently, donors specify conditions on how aid is used and how 
programs are implemented. (Chambers and Pettit, 2004). The problem that arises 
is that foreign funding often creates program objectives in a very different context 
than where they will be implemented. Therefore, those objectives often do not fit 
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the cultures that receive them. (Lindenberg, 2001). Donor priorities fluctuate 
towards development areas that are currently popular. (Degnbol-Martinussen and 
Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). These frequent fluctuations in donor priorities increase 
environmental uncertainty and the pressure to implement programs that are likely 
to be seen as “successful” rather than addressing the root of the problem, which 
usually involves complex, long-term processes. Funders often favor programs 
with easily quantifiable results, but these often are not able to promote longer-
term, sustainable projects (Lindenberg, 2001). Similarly, donor agendas may limit 
particular political strategies, even when they lead to greater long-term and 
meaningful social change. (Markowitz and Tice, 2002). 
 
Furthermore, the financial instability in many recipient countries makes salaried 
employment at an NGO a much greater opportunity than what would otherwise be 
available, and therefore, securing grants at any cost can become a powerful focus 
of some organizations (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001). These aspects of power and 
dependency have resulted in some NGOs shifting their focus from important areas 
for their beneficiaries, towards areas of donor interest that will attract a large 
amount of funding (Edwards and Hulme, 1998). 
Organizations further down the aid chain from their funding sources will be 
subject to formal pressure to adopt donor-driven goals, policies, and standardized 
procedures. (Lister, 2000). Informal pressures to adopt the values, norms, and 
legitimating practices have a powerful effect on dependent organizations. (Brehm, 
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2001). Together, these direct and indirect pressures have resulted in NGOs in 
developing countries adopting Northern agendas and practices. 
 
2.6. The dependency trap 
 
Scholars argue that the relationship between NGOs and donors often becomes 
trapped in a dependency cycle. Kendall W. Stiles (2002) identifies three stages in 
the NGO-Donor relationship, based on his research of NGOs in Bangladesh, 
which he refers to as the “intermestic development circles”. (Stiles, 2002). He 
maintains that social structures gradually emerge from an initiation stage to 
institutionalization stage and finally to the maturation stage. The initiation stage is 
characterized by bargaining and negotiating, where each side expresses its 
interests and objectives. Donors always want to do more with less, while NGOs 
aim for more with more. (Stiles, 2002). After this phase, the relationship between 
NGOs and donors reaches the institutionalization stage. This stage is 
characterized by basic contract agreements; the donor approves funding and the 
NGO begins to work on a project that is monitored and evaluated by the donor. 
When the relationship becomes prolonged and is based on ongoing interaction 
and coordination, it enters the next stage, which is the maturation stage. This stage 
of maturation is distinguished by a coherent social structure that separates itself 
from the rest of society. All members of the donor-NGO circle undergo certain 
changes to fit within the emerging structure; however, the degree of change is 
relative. Donors must reposition themselves to accommodate the demands of 
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other members; however, the change they undergo is subtle compared to that 
initiated by domestic organizations. (AbouAssi, 2012). Stiles (2002) calls this 
change the ‘universalization of like-mindedness’, where the policies and 
objectives of donors and NGOs start to converge or reflect each other. (Stiles, 
2012). 
 
On the receiver end, NGOs are compelled to dramatically transform their 
operation and organizational cultures to the extent that they lose much of their 
local identity, as well as their touch with constituents. Hence, the further down the 
maturation stage, the less is the ability of these NGOs to work on their own and 
the more dependent they become on external funding. (AbouAssi, 2012).  
 
2.7. Uncertainty in the Relationship 
Within this dependency lies uncertainty. The NGO-donor relationship is 
especially volatile because of the inconsistency in donors’ funding and the 
consequent confusion and instability among partner organizations. Landell-Mills 
(1992) emphasized that “external funding should always take the form of 
supplementary assistance and ought never be the main source of what is needed”. 
(Landell-Mills, 1992: 554). Otherwise, the sustainability of the organization 
becomes highly questionable. (AbouAssi, 2012). 
In developing countries, “donors develop their programs, preferences and 
priorities and revise them at an ever-increasing pace, while NGOs try to figure out 
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how they might fit in or if they meet the criteria underlying the latest 
preoccupation of donors”. (Doornbos, 2003: 15). Frequent fluctuation in funding 
priorities entrenches uncertainty in the surrounding environment of the NGOs and 
leads to additional pressure on and confusion among these organizations. 
(Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003).  
The consequences of such uncertainty and confusion take different forms. One 
consequence is the drive towards changes in the governance, management, and 
culture of recipient organizations. NGOs start modifying their organizational 
culture to fit with the changing surrounding environment. 
Another consequence of the discrepancy between donors’ interests and NGOs’ 
objectives is the rising concept of ‘designation’. (Barman, 2008). This concept 
basically means that the funder specifies where the contribution is to be spent and 
which beneficiaries are to be targeted, instead of allocating an unrestricted grant. 
(Barman, 2008). Such a practice is at the heart of international development 
assistance, evidenced through the conditionality of grants in terms of targeted 
(and excluded) beneficiaries and locales and types of services to be delivered or 
brands of products purchased (Basombrio, 2000). 
The most critical consequence is that as the NGO adjusts and conforms to the 
agendas, expectations, and interests of donors, it loses touch with its mission and 
constituency. This practice is defined as goal displacement, which “occurs when 
goals and activities are modified to satisfy the wishes of contributors” (Froelich, 
1999: 250). 
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When an NGO shifts its programs to appeal to and appease the donor’s appetite, 
its role and practices are “determined ... by donor fashion and demands according 
to ideas and designs imposed and imported from outside” (Edwards, Hulme and 
Wallace, 1999: 130). Despite an NGO’s candid emphasis on or attempt to serve 
beneficiaries, NGOs’ reliance on foreign resources shifts their sights and priorities 
to align with donor interests. (Chambers and Pettit, 2004). In the expressively 
titled article, ‘AIDS is Money’, Simon Morfit (2011) asserts that to maintain 
credibility and viability among international donors, Sub-Saharan African NGOs 
had to ‘do AIDS’ because this was the priority of international funders. While the 
status of these NGOs rose vis-à-vis other organizations working on other sectors, 
attention was also diverted away from other critical problems faced by African 
communities (Morfit, 2011). Thus, when the NGO sector becomes heavily 
dependent on donor agencies, such as in Kenya where 90% of NGOs’ funds come 
from foreign aid (Hearn, 1998), NGOs find themselves in a dependency trap; 
“they needed the financial resources provided by donors in order to survive” 
(Bieber, 2002: 27). 
Due to increased dependency and inconsistent donor funding, NGOs have to 
struggle with balancing normative development imperatives and institutional 
imperatives. The normative imperative is considered a bottom line approach that 
compensates for the failures of other sectors, empowers marginalized groups, 
encourages voice, focuses on stakeholders, highlights flexibility and risk taking, 
and invests in impact-oriented programs towards long term goals that ensure 
sustainability. (Smith and Gronbjerg, 2006). However, institutional imperatives 
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lead to a hierarchical relationship, with bureaucratization and duplication of 
initiatives, falloff in flexibility and innovation, a compromised ability to articulate 
ideas and values, a critical suspicion by and isolation from local interests, loss of 
small-scale comparative advantage, and conflicting accountability mechanisms 
(Sanayal, 1997). 
The abundance and inconsistency of funding constitute a twofold risk. Abundance 
of funding might attract “unscrupulous organizations possessing agendas which 
are antithetical” to donors’ priorities or to the community’s needs and interests 
(Robinson, 1995: 76). Inconsistency in funding exhausts NGOs and forces them 
to pay attention to donors rather than to their constituencies. 
 
2.8. Explaining NGO behavior 
In his book “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty”, Albert O. Hirschman (1970) explains his 
theory of exit, voice and loyalty options in terms of consumers who feel that the 
products of a particular company are deteriorating (see figure 2). Even though his 
theory is stated in terms of businesses and the market, it has a further application 
on partner organizations. Hirschman’s theory argues that customers who are 
dissatisfied with a particular product or service, have the choice to either 
complain to the firm and call for change (voice) or simply leave the firm and find 
an alternative one (exit) (Hirschman, 1970). According to Hirschman, the key 
determinant of the choice between exit and voice is the flexibility of the demand 
for a particular product or service. In other words, the necessity of this product or 
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service to the consumer and the ability to find an alternative dictate consumer’s 
reaction and behavior. 
‘Exit’ is a feasible solution for consumers as long as there are other options 
available to them. In competitive markets, consumers can easily switch from one 
firm to another. Hence, if a consumer is not pleased at one firm, ‘exit’ is the 
viable solution to the customer. However, if the market is monopolized and the 
product is a necessity, ‘exit’ is no longer possible solution to the consumer. 
(Hirschman, 1970). No matter how low the quality is, customers can no longer 
leave since this is the only option to get what they need. However, they can still 
utter discontent to the management by using the ‘voice’ solution. This solution 
requires the customer to put up with the degradation of the product for a period of 
time and the uncertainty of whether the firm could come back on track or not. 
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Figure 2: Hirschman's model of explaining behavior 
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Hirschman then discusses the interactions between both ‘exit’ and ‘voice’. He 
illustrates that when both options are available to the consumer, the consumer will 
end up more probably choosing ‘exit’ over ‘voice’. (Hirschman, 1970). The 
consumer will simply look for a better alternative and leave. On the other hand, 
customers will only resort to ‘voice’ when they have faith that the management 
will respond effectively to their complaints. (Hirschman, 1970). 
To Hirschman, with the concepts of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ comes the concept of 
‘loyalty’ or ‘adjustment’. He introduces loyalty and defines it as a feeling of 
attachment to an organization of which one is a member. (Hirschman, 1970). 
With the presence of loyalty, the cost of ‘exit’ is higher. Hence, loyalty alters 
behavior and pressures the consumer to invoke their ‘voice’ option instead. 
Loyalty can delay the ‘exit’ option but not exclude it entirely. Hirschman (1970) 
stresses that loyalty is a rational calculated behavior. Thus, if loyalists find no 
change after exhausting the ‘voice’ option and are convinced that the firm is 
doomed to fail, they would ‘exit’ for sure. 
In application to the NGO-donor relationship, the demand for funding, as a 
product or service, is supposedly elastic due to the fluctuation in NGO reliance on 
external resources and the growth in operations. Thus, the assumption is that 
‘exit’ could be a common option because demand is changing. However, in the 
practical world, NGOs have different modes of reactions based on several factors. 
One important factor is the availability and access to information. The more the 
NGO has access to information about the donor’s interests and plans; it is more 
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likely to practice the ‘voice’ option. (Gehlbach, 2006). The cost of the  ‘exit’ 
option here is very high because the NGO has already made investments in its 
organizational capacity to comply with donor requirements. 
Another crucial factor is the time interval of the relationship. When there is a long 
relationship between the NGO and the donor, the probability of using the ‘voice’ 
option is far greater than the ‘exit’ one. (AbouAssi, 2012). With a longer 
relationship, the NGO is able to understand what is going on and what is coming 
next. There are systems already in place that allow the NGO to respond to donor 
requirements of reporting, accounting, monitoring, and evaluation. (AbouAssi, 
2012). NGOs invested in these systems because they wanted to relax and stabilize 
their relationship with the donors. Therefore, dissatisfaction with a donor decision 
is not, in itself, critical enough for the NGO to ‘exit’. They resort to bargaining 
instead because it is worth the NGO’s invested time, efforts, and resources. 
(AbouAssi, 2012). 
The most important factor, however, is the availability of other donors. While the 
previous two factors take the concept of ‘loyalty’ into great consideration when 
taking decisions, this factor does not. Whenever an opportunity poses itself in 
front of the NGO for a better donor, the NGO will immediately use the ‘exit’ 
option. As mentioned previously, ‘loyalty’ is a calculated behavior. (Hirschman, 
1970). The cost of ‘exit’ here is low because the donor cannot impose any penalty 
on the NGO for its behavior or decision to leave. 
These factors help explain the behavior of NGOs most of the time. However, 
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organizations are best understood through analyzing their behavior economically 
rather than their internal social or political dynamics. Any serious endeavor to 
explore how ‘exit, ‘voice’, and ‘loyalty’ show up in actual everyday behavior 
among nonprofits needs to confront the ways that labeling organizations as 
‘nonprofit’ is heavily loaded with economic bias. (AbouAssi, 2012). Accordingly, 
‘exit’, ‘voice’, and ‘loyalty’ are primarily economic behaviors, as opposed to 
political or social behaviors. 
 
In conclusion, the main argument here is that shifts in donor funding have 
transformed the NGO sector in developing countries. The transformation is 
perceived as being holistic and deterministic in that a single NGO cannot swim 
against the flow and has to exhibit the same behavior as others. (AbouAssi, 2012). 
However, this might not be—and it is more likely not—the case. One way to 
understand NGOs’ behavior is to consider shifts in funding as a form of 
deterioration in a relationship between a consumer (NGO) and a producer (donor). 
Consequently, the following section examines the nature of the relationship 
between NGOs and donors in an attempt to understand NGOs’ behavior and 
reaction to shifts in donors’ priorities. 
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UNDERSTANDING NGO BEHAVIOR 
 
3.1. Relationship between States and NGOs    
In developing countries, the relationship between the State and NGOs can take 
one of three forms: dependency, collaboration, or confrontation. (Lorgan, 1998). 
NGO dependency on the state is very rare due to the government’s will to control 
the actions of NGOs and also due to the limitations of funds. Collaboration can 
take place sometimes when NGOs work on policy issue, which is also not very 
common. Douglas Webb (2004) suggests that “long-term sustainability ... lies in 
the support that NGOs can provide to government rather than vice versa, and the 
development of NGO capacity must not be at the expense of that within 
government and public sector ranks”. (Webb, 2004: 22). 
Confrontation is the most prominent form of relationship between states and 
NGOs. The relationship between states and NGOs is identified as being 
problematic. Due to political competition and lack of resources, the relationship 
between some developing states and NGOs had proved to be extremely difficult 
which has had negative implications for coordination of efforts. (Batsell, 2005). 
Hence, the relationship between both actors proves to be weak and fragile. The 
consequence of the weaknesses in the relationship between the state and NGOs is 
translated in NGOs’ resorting to international donors for funding.   
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3.2. Relationship between donors and NGOs 
Most NGOs in the developing countries rely on international donors for policies 
and funding. It is hard to make generalizations about the nature of the relationship 
between donors and NGOs. However, most scholars who have studied the 
peculiarities of the NGO-donor relationship, argue that donors usually dominate 
the relationship. (Hook, 1995; Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999; Martens, 2008). The 
supply-led approach is the most prevailing in the NGO-donor relationship. 
(Martens, 2008). Donors have interests to accommodate in return for providing 
resources to NGOs. 
Donors situate themselves outside of the local context, while in reality they are an 
integral part of it. Not only are donor agencies acting as governmental 
organizations executing the policies of their countries, they are also key players in 
shaping the national policies of aid recipient countries. (Mitchell, 1991). Donor 
agencies shape the national policies of recipient countries directly and indirectly 
by negotiating priorities and controlling aid. They also establish direct and 
indirect partnerships and networks with local actors, which lead, in some cases, to 
the introduction of programs and strategies at odds with the local environment, 
and in other cases, the reinforcement of existing social and economic inequalities. 
(Mitchell, 1991). Hence, development can be crippled by those who claim to 
support it.  
The process of goal displacement can be deceptive. Bebbington (2004) uses the 
term ‘intentional’ development to describe international aid channeled into 
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programs with specific goals set by donor agencies and their partners, including 
NGOs. Carothers and Ottaway (2000) note that the donors follow the same 
approach everywhere: funding objectives are created in donors’ headquarters, a 
completely different context and environment than where programs will be 
implemented (Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001). Some of the assistance programs 
take what the local people are familiar with and actually know and formulate it 
into well-developed ideas that appeal to funding strategies and fit within current 
development paradigms. The local people become sole recipients of assistance 
instead of being the agents of change (Schlesinger, 2007: 60). 
This is coupled with changes in the political economy of aid. Development 
assistance retains a spotlight in the international policy agenda, but must compete 
for resources and attention amidst concerns around peace, security, and anti-
terrorism (Bryant and Kappaz, 2005). The general commitment to aid is being 
challenged. With a new global poverty agenda, countries had to review their 
funding strategies and aid distribution (Bebbington, 2004). NGOs had to ‘explore 
market-based approaches to development to sustain funding for services 
provision. More emphasis has been placed on the scrutiny of funds, and 
consequently on demonstrating evidence about the impact of development 
programs. Arguably, the intended result was to quickly find success stories, 
satisfy the interests of donors, and demonstrate impacts to secure additional 
funding. However, the result is that the same group of people is continuously 
targeted with development initiatives, limiting the scope of impact. 
The second approach in the donor-NGOs relationship is the demand-led model. 
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Golub (2000) calls for more “home-grown ideas of individuals and organizations 
most likely to blend dedication, innovation and flexibility” (158). After all, 
“development happens mainly through homegrown efforts” (Easterly, 2007: 29). 
In a demand-led model, NGOs assume responsibility and take the initiative in 
designing and presenting their agenda and preferences; donor agencies would then 
place “consolidated resources at the disposal of local institutions that decide on 
and own the uses to which they are put” (Edwards, Hulme and Wallace, 1999: 
123). This recipient-donor approach is a process of mutual learning, transparency 
and participation, and equal partnership (Doornbos, 2003). 
The demand-led model in the donor-NGO relationship is participatory. 
Participation challenges any monopoly in development. However, the approach 
has received less attention compared to the supply-led approach, since, 
admittedly, it is rare in the world of development aid.  
 
3.3. The Question of Partnership 
The term ‘partnership’ has increasingly been used in policy and practice to 
describe the relationship between international donors and NGOs in developing 
countries (Lister, 2000; Harrison, 2007). In this context, partnership is suggestive 
of a qualitatively different type of relationship from that of international donors 
merely working with NGOs in developing countries. The rhetoric of partnership is 
based on the many supposed benefits that such a relationship may bring to 
development work. Such benefits commonly fall into two groups. First, 
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partnership may result in a more efficient and effective effort. For example, Lister 
(2000) suggests that synergies derived from partnerships may make better use of 
scarce resources and increase the sustainability of interventions. Secondly, 
partnerships are believed to allow devolution of power with development 
decisions being taken closer to local communities (Harrison, 2007) perhaps with 
the direct involvement of potential beneficiaries (Lister, 2000). Harrison (2007: 
391) goes as far as suggesting that the ‘rhetoric of partnership therefore focuses 
on reversing the power relations in the aid chain’. 
However, a number of authors question whether the developing rhetoric of 
partnership signifies a change in relationships between international donors and 
NGOs in developing countries. In terms of the actual relationships, Harrison 
(2007) states that different agencies may have different conceptions of principles 
underpinning, as well as the behaviors associated with, partnerships. Moreover, 
Lister (2000: 228) criticizes partnership as a idea imposed by developed countries 
and suggests that development of ‘authentic partnerships’ are constrained by the 
control of funding retained by international donors. Summing up these factors, 
Laird (2007: 467) argues that: 
“Despite the rhetoric of partnership, NGOs in developing countries, whether 
indigenous or the country programmes of international organizations, generally 
acquiesce in the development agenda of donors or their northern-based head 
offices.” 
Seckinelgin (2004) makes a similar point, suggesting that the use of the term 
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partnership commonly masks the ongoing power relations between NGOs and 
international donors. Power relationships between international donors and NGOs 
in developing countries are discussed by a wide variety of authors. The power of 
international donors resides primarily in the funding that they make available. 
Batsell (2001: 16) suggests that NGOs in developing countries become tied to the 
agendas adopted by international donors. Similarly, Zaidi (1999) suggests that the 
short-term and project-specific nature of funding results in NGOs working within 
tight constraints and on highly specified tasks. More generally, the system of 
funding from international donors has reduced the diversity of NGOs due to a 
‘self-replicating’ process of funding being directed to the largest NGOs (Hulme 
and Edwards, 1996). 
Besides the generalities of the system of international funding, processes related 
to accountability, such as monitoring and evaluation, are widely identified as 
mechanisms that reinforce power relations. A number of authors report that NGOs 
are increasingly becoming accountable to international donors rather than to the 
communities with which they work (Zaidi, 1999). Moreover, imposed norms and 
systems of monitoring and evaluation have additional effects on development 
work by NGOs in developing countries. These effects include NGOs focusing on 
short-term quantitative outputs (Zaidi, 1999), considering only their own 
performance rather than co-operating with other NGOs and overlooking the long-
term impact of provision (Seckinelgin, 2005).  
Overall consequences of these power relations may have significant implications 
for individual NGOs and the NGO sector as a whole. Hulme and Edwards (1996) 
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suggests that the alterations to NGOs’ modes of operation engendered by funding 
from international donors are continually reinforced and reproduced. This 
suggestion is also recognized by Seckinelgin (2005: 359) who observes that 
NGOs that participate in funding relationships, in which they are regarded as 
service delivery tools gradually become disconnected from their community 
relationships. 
These effects create a paradox in which a supposed basis for NGOs’ 
effectiveness, their democratic relationships with local communities and 
individuals, is undermined resulting in a reduced capacity to initiate social change 
(Edwards and Hulme, 1996). 
 
3.4. Shifts in Behavior: Donor priorities vs. Community based 
Assessment 
 
Being closer to the poor, NGOs are widely believed to provide better-targeted aid 
than state agencies. It has traditionally been an article of faith (Tendler, 1982) that 
NGOs are closer to the poor than official aid agencies, and that the allocation of 
NGO aid is less distorted by commercial and political mandates of state agencies. 
As for foreign aid, economic and political self-interest of donors appears to have 
had an important impact on the allocation of aid across recipient countries 
(Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Berthelemy, 2006). 
In several respects, NGOs may provide better-targeted aid than official donors. 
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They are closer to the community and they know what they really need. However, 
donor political or commercial interests have usually triumphed over the needs-
based allocation of aid. The NGO might know best about the target groups that 
need aid, yet because they do not have control over the funds; they end up 
executing projects that are of more priority to the donors. 
The dependence of many NGOs on external funding shapes their aid allocation. 
They follow their donor interests in order to continue receiving grants. 
Consequently, their aid allocation is no longer relevant in terms of targeting the 
needy and deserving. Eventually, NGOs start allocating aid strategically by 
targeting the less poor where success is easier to achieve. (Koch et al., 2007). In 
other words, NGOs may be tempted to improve the chances of continued official 
refinancing by demonstrating visible results that tend to be easier to achieve with 
projects addressing less entrenched forms of poverty. 
A prominent example of shifting behavior of NGOs is Lea Jellinek’s account of 
an Indonesian NGO that started as a small grassroots-style microbank for women. 
(Jellinek, 2003). Due to donor funding, it grew very rapidly in less than three 
years and changed its focus to good governance programs. Jellinek (2003) states 
that although the NGO is considered to be a great success with donors, the NGO’s 
focus shifted from its original grassroots style and goal to support the poor to 
being a “complex, top-down, technically oriented capital-intensive 
bureaucracy…out of touch with what was happening on the ground”. (Jellinek, 
2003: 179). The NGO focused on professionalization through the opening of more 
offices, equipping them with computers and other technology, and spending time 
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organizing formal events with government officials. However, the NGO’s daily 
work involved less and less contact with the community, less democratic selection 
procedures of community representatives, and limited delivery of programs that 
actually reached the poor. Despite these problems, the organization’s growth and 
professionalization increased its legitimacy with donors. (Jellinek, 2003).  
 
In order to demonstrate success, NGOs are inclined to minimize risk which 
weakens their incentive to operate in difficult environments where failure may 
jeopardize future funding. Accordingly, NGOs may become completely delinked 
from the local needs of the people. Abandoning the community needs assessment 
entails neglecting the group that needed the aid the most. Donors, thus, dominate 
the behavior of NGOs, and donor interest is prioritized over local needs. 
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CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE NGO SCENE IN EGYPT (Since 
2011) 
 
4.1. The nature of Egypt’s NGO community 
Egypt has the largest NGO sector in the Arab world, and commentators and 
scholars often note how vibrant Egyptian civil society is in comparison with many 
of its neighbors. (Pollock, 2013). Yet, until the recent transition in 2011, Egypt 
was a repressive, semi-autocratic state, which routinely violated the human rights 
of its citizens. It sought to maintain control of, or at least influence over, many 
aspects of life, including civil society, and the laws governing Egyptian NGOs are 
extremely restrictive. It remains in question how much this will change under the 
revised constitution and the democratically elected government. 
Egypt has a large and vibrant NGO sector, yet it also has restrictive laws 
governing NGOs, and the government has frequently cracked down on the sector, 
both before and after the 25 January Revolution. Therefore, the question is; what 
explains the size and vibrancy of Egyptian civil society in the face of this 
repression? After exploring the nature of the NGO sector in Egypt, it is estimated 
that internal and external pressures on the Egyptian government as well as a lack 
of state capacity for repression might explain the size of the NGO sector. The 
Egyptian government intentionally promoted the growth of the NGO sector, while 
using the state’s coercive power to influence these organizations. By both 
promoting and manipulating NGOs, the state has been able to pursue several 
objectives: providing social services with fewer state resources; co-opting 
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organizations into behaving in accordance with state interests; pitting potential 
opposition factions against one another; and improving the state’s image abroad 
while discrediting liberalism at home. (Pollock, 2013). While the Revolution in 
2011 brought renewed hope for legal reform, the future of NGOs in Egypt 
remains unstable.  
With over 90 million citizens and around 40,000 registered local NGOs, despite a 
history of highly restrictive NGO laws, Egypt is described as having one of the 
largest and most vital civil society sectors in the developing world. (Mikhail, 
2014). The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) explains that 
while the Egyptian government never used an outright ban on civil society, it 
conveniently provided “enormous discretionary powers to the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity.” (Mikhail, 2014). 
Following the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and despite a rapid and insistent 
expansion of civil society, the government’s relationship with NGOs only 
worsened, due to multiple attempts to pass more restrictive laws and an actual 
physical crackdown on existing NGOs. (Mikhail, 2014). Those organizations 
were supposedly more committed and effective in reaching the poor than were the 
governments of developing countries. The nature of their work requires NGOs to 
interact with local communities on a daily basis, building relationships of 
cooperation and trust to understand local needs and tailor projects that respond to 
those needs. However, due to restrictive laws and lack of government resources, 
several NGOs had to restructure their operations. Instead of having intimate 
working relationships with the people of the community, several NGOs shifted 
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their focus towards projects that suit new partnerships with foreign donor 
agencies. (Pullock, 2013).  
 
4.2. Foreign funding in Egypt after 2011 
Prior to the outbreak of revolution on 25 January 2011, Egypt’s vibrant civil 
society already played an important role in raising public awareness. In the 
aftermath of the revolution, however, controversy over foreign funding to 
Egyptian NGOs within both the Egyptian press and the general public grew. The 
underlying problems stem, to a large extent, from the deficient legal framework 
that regulates the work of NGOs in Egypt. Many NGOs are forced to accept 
foreign funding due to the lack of domestic funds, from donations, endowments, 
and other sources of charity, and the abuse by the regime of the few governmental 
resources available. The Mubarak regime took advantage of the existing legal 
loopholes in order selectively to punish or reward NGOs according to their 
political line. The former regime also used the issue of ‘foreign funding’ to 
discredit certain NGOs or civil society’s call for democratic reform in general. 
While some critics in Egypt are genuinely suspicious of the intentions of 
externally- funded organizations, others distort their role in an attempt to stain 
their image in the eyes of the public. (Elagati, 2013). 
Public opinion had some concerns about foreign funding. According to Mohamed 
Elagati (2013), there are several negative aspects of NGO foreign funding in 
Egypt. The main negative aspects include: donors forcing a specific agenda onto 
the general work of the organization; flawed legislation governing foreign 
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funding; unwillingness amongst NGOs to reveal sources and amounts of foreign 
funding, as well as  the conditions under which it was granted; donor intervention 
in the work of these organizations; creating ‘local agents’ for the donor states’ 
vested interests; foreign funding inciting the creation of projects by local NGOs 
only for the sake of securing funding; the misuse of foreign funds by some NGOs 
for illicit purposes, giving a negative image to foreign institutions and civil 
society as a whole; the risk of civil society corruption and the creation of a new 
class of Egyptians working with foreign organizations that depend on foreign 
money; abundant foreign funding reducing Egyptian NGOs’ preparedness to 
search for local sources of funding, thus weakening the development of local 
alternatives; and the risk of a long-term structural dependence of Egyptian NGOs 
on foreign funding. (Elagati, 2013).  
These concerns, however, did not fundamentally affect the presence or influence 
of foreign donors in Egypt. Most international donors have increased their 
funding for Egyptian NGOs after the revolution, focusing their activities more 
strongly on civil participation, supporting youth, the media, freedom of 
information and political participation, as well as social justice. (Elagati, 2013). 
Moreover, important governmental donors such as USAID and the European 
Commission have scrapped controversial pre-revolutionary policies of requiring 
civil society grants to be cleared with the Egyptian authorities first. 
According to an investigation file on NGO foreign funding submitted to the Cairo 
Criminal Court by the investigating authorities in February 2012, Investigative 
Judges Sameh Abu-Zeid and Ashraf el Ashrawy claimed that 95 per cent of the 
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money spent by the investigated foreign organizations came from the US. The 
report claimed that prior to the revolution, US organizations spent around $1 
million per year in Egypt; after the revolution, their workload increased 
substantially and funds amounted to $18 million in one year. The investigation 
also demonstrated that approximately 95 per cent of funds during the past year 
were used to support the work of new post-revolution entities. (Elagati, 2013).  
The scope of this study does not allow for an exhaustive or representative 
overview of all foreign funding provided to Egyptian organizations. However, in 
financial terms, among the most important foreign supporters of democratic 
reform and civil society in Egypt are governmental and non-governmental donors 
from the European Union and the United States, as well as international 
multilateral organizations. Important non- governmental sources include the Ford 
Foundation, Freedom House, and the Arab Human Rights Fund. Moreover, a 
broad range of foreign NGOs provides technical assistance in supporting 
‘political’ civil society. These include notably the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International 
Republican Institute (IRI), and German political party foundations, including the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, and the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation. 
Understanding the role of civil society in Egypt before and after the revolution is 
not possible without a detailed understanding of the question of financing. 
Understanding the question of funding is the key to explaining the changing 
behavior and interests of NGOs in Egypt. 
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4.3.  Shifts in interests and specialization  
After the 25 January Revolution in 2011, foreign donor preferences have shifted 
more towards the concept of ‘democratic transition’. Foreign donors showed a 
keen interest in playing a large role in shaping the country’s transition towards 
democracy. When donor interests shifted towards the focus on democratic 
development, NGOs that relied on or needed foreign funding in Egypt, in most 
cases, had three choices: tailor their projects based on donor priorities (loyalty), 
negotiate with donors to receive funds related to their original vision (voice), or to 
quit (exit). The available research material on NGOs in Egypt demonstrates that 
the two situations that are more likely to occur are either ‘loyalty’ or ‘exit’. The 
following section illustrates examples of cases that occurred in Egypt that explain 
how a shift in donor interests can affect NGO behavior. 
 
4.3.1. USAID 
Just a few weeks after Mubarak’s regime was toppled, the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) directed some $65 million towards 
"democratic development” programmes in Egypt, out of total economic and civil 
assistance estimated at around $200 million in 2010/2011. (El-din, 2011). 
 
USAID made a big shift in its funding priorities in Egypt. The Egyptian 
government itself notes that USAID has played an active role in rebuilding the 
Egyptian economy over more than 30 years. Furthermore, there is no question that 
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USAID has played an enormous role in improving Egypt’s infrastructure, 
especially in the sectors of telecommunications, electricity, health and sanitary 
drainage.” Official figures show that USAID has offered Egypt more than $50 
billion in civil assistance over 40 years. (El-din, 2011). 
 
Since 2011, USAID has showed great interest in funding projects related to 
democratic transition in Egypt. There is no denying that democratic transition in 
Egypt matters immensely to the United States strategically. US Ambassador to 
Egypt Ann Patterson clearly stated: “It matters to our allies, and it will serve as a 
model for the rest of the Arab world”. (El-din, 2011). The USAID has allocated 
millions of dollars to democratic development programmes. It has granted $105 
million to various non-governmental organizations to assist with their 
participation in the political life of the country. (El-din, 2011). 
 
According to a Middle East Online study on US aid in Egypt, more than one 
thousand Egyptians have lined up to submit proposals at USAID’s Cairo office to 
obtain grants allocated to democratic transition programmes. (El-din, 2011). 
While a significant number of NGOs shifted their priorities in accordance with the 
USAID new interests in order to receive funds, other NGOs such as the Egyptian 
Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) has declined to apply for grants from the 
USAID. Hafez Abu Saeda, chairman of the Egyptian Organization for Human 
rights, in a statement to Ahram online has indicated that NGOs that accept money 
from USAID should be very clear about its objectives rather than the NGOs’ 
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original objectives. (El-din, 2011). In other words, USAID will always prioritize 
the United States’ strategic interests in Egypt over the interest of the people at the 
community level. The EOHR was fortunate, however, because its funding 
depended on local sources and other foreign donors. Hence, a shift in donor 
priority did not affect the behavior of this particular NGO because it had other 
sources for survival. 
  
4.3.2. NED 
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) “was launched in the early 
1980s, premised on the idea that American assistance on behalf of democracy 
efforts abroad would be good both for the U.S. and for those struggling around the 
world for freedom and self-government.” (NED). NED has never shifted its 
interests; democracy has always been its priority. After 25 January revolution, 
NED became interested in Egypt more than ever before because it initiated a path 
towards democratic transition. During my internship at the Arab House 
Foundation for Human Rights (AHFHR), I got to meet the program officer of the 
Middle East North Africa region working for NED, Ms. Tatjana Sharif-San Luis. 
Ms. Luis informed me prior to her visit that she was coming to Egypt and wanted 
to meet with the NGO staff and discuss the work we do. During her visit, I got to 
talk to her about my thesis and she was very helpful in answering some of the 
questions I had. I asked her why did NED send a program officer after they have 
already approved the proposal sent by the NGO. She answered by saying that they 
had installed a new system where NGOs only receive an initial approval based on 
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the project proposal submitted and then a program officer has to visit the NGO for 
a second and final approval. When I asked her about the importance of the second 
approval, she replied stating that over the past year they have received over 
hundreds of proposals that look good on paper, however, from NGOs that had no 
prior experience in democratic development. NED realized that projects were 
being tailored in accordance with their objectives for the sake of funding. Her 
final comments were about how NGOs in Egypt have become resource dependent 
to a significant extent where interests are being changed and priorities are being 
set for the sake of receiving the grant. 
 
The aforementioned examples of NGOs and foreign donor agencies are a few 
examples of the relationship between both entities. The following chapter will 
investigate a case study of the Arab House Foundation for Human Rights in 
detail.  
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CASE STUDY 
ARAB HOUSE FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
5.1. Case Profile 
5.1.1. Operating Context 
The Arab House Foundation for Human Rights is an association focused on 
awareness programs. Consequently, it works with experts on human rights to create 
activities not only in Cairo, but more importantly in governorates that are less 
privileged. This kind of association works on community-based projects, hence, it is 
of great importance that those communities understand the nature of the association 
and the projects it implements. For this reason, AHFHR staff not only make plans for 
the project, but more importantly, each and every single member of the staff is 
involved in the implementation process of every project until the very end. This 
creates good relationships with community members, which facilitates the 
implementation process of the project and enhances a positive feedback towards the 
foundation’s activities.  
 
5.1.2. History 
The Arab House Foundation for Human Rights is a newly established association. It 
received approval as a development organization on March 2013. Since then, 
AHFHR has started an array of projects and activities related to human rights 
awareness in Egypt. The foundation has tried to cover all news related to human 
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rights violations in Egypt and post them on its webpage to increase awareness among 
readers. Furthermore, the association has organized workshops and training sessions 
to teach members of society from several governorates in Egypt about their basic 
human rights and how to call for them. 
 
5.1.3. Overall Mission 
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights is a local Egyptian association founded 
under the Egyptian law of Non-Governmental Organizations. AHFHR believes that 
nations will not develop unless every individual’s rights are respected. This can be 
achieved only after they become aware of their rights and how to call for those rights. 
This explains the role of the association. It is its ultimate vision. 
 
5.1.4. Institutional structure 
Being a newly established association, the institutional structure of the AHFHR is not 
a complex one. Basically it is consisted of three segments. The first segment is the 
Upper Council, which administers all formal decisions and plans in the association. 
The upper council comprises four positions of the senior staff. Those positions are: 
the president of the council, vice president of the council, General Secretary, and the 
treasurer. The president of the council, Mr. Ehab Rady, is responsible for top 
management decisions and plans executed within the foundation. Along with Mr. 
Rady, the vice president is there to plan activities and organize the team needed for 
every activity carried out by the foundation. The general secretary is another 
important member of the team, as he organizes not only all meetings within the upper 
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council, but more importantly organizes all business trips, interviews volunteers, and 
schedules training sessions and workshops. The final member of the upper council is 
the treasurer. This person is responsible for taking care of the finance of the 
association as well as finding possible sources of funding. 
 
The second segment is the Experts Council. This council is responsible for 
investigating, researching, and studying the most problematic issues in regards to 
human rights in Egypt. It looks at key issues and considers how the foundation might 
tackle them. This council works under the supervision of the president of the 
association, who makes the final decision on which key issues are more relevant. 
The third segment of the institutional structure is the Volunteering Team. This team is 
where all the magic happens. Part of those volunteers are prominent figures in 
society: parliamentary candidates, university professors, journalists, or human rights 
activists. Those are the part of the volunteering team responsible for giving trainings. 
However, the workshop itself is organized by the upper council along with another set 
of younger volunteers. This set of volunteers act as organizers for the workshop. 
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Figure 3: AHFHR's Organizational Structure 
 
 
5.1.5. NGO’s Objective 
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights’ main objective is to spread awareness 
amongst citizens about their basic human rights and how to call for them. 
 Teaching citizens about their human rights and how can they protect them. 
 Executing basic human rights awareness programs in the least privileged 
governorates in Egypt. 
 Stressing the importance of a dignified life for everyone. 
 Reaching out to a larger group of the community who has been suffering from 
human rights abuse. 
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5.1.6. Approach towards achieving its objectives 
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights adopts a participatory approach to 
development. This foundation is based on engaging the civil society in every project 
or activity undertaken by the AHFHR. This approach is driven by its main objective 
of empowering civil society members through engaging them in training and 
workshops in order to enhance their participation as active members in society.  
 
5.1.7. Relationship with its constituency 
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights, unlike other associations, does not focus 
on one specified target group. The foundation looks at the community as a whole. 
Since its main focus is human rights problems in Egypt, the foundation believes that 
what it is offering is suitable for all sectors of society. In every project, it tries to 
reach out to all individuals in Egypt. AHFHR has implemented its projects up till now 
in Cairo, Alexandria, Qena, Al-Gharbia, and Bani-Sweif. In the future, the foundation 
is planning to cover the governorates in Egypt, particularly in the least privileged 
areas where teaching them about their rights is very essential, particularly in today’s 
world. 
 
The relationship between the foundation and its public is a very friendly one. It is 
based on guidance and assistance. This participatory approach to development in 
which civil society and target groups participate in the development process and are 
essential players in the implementation process guarantees more sustainability. This 
approach gives the beneficiaries a sense of ownership and belonging to the project 
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and their capacities are built to carry out the acquired skills and activities after the end 
of the project. Thus, the Arab House Foundation for Human Rights implements its 
projects through working with the community. 
 
5.1.8. Relationship with other organizations 
The Arab House Foundation for Human Rights is part of a congregation of 76 human 
rights organizations in Egypt. Almost 40 of those associations- including AHFHR- 
have very strong bonds due to their similar agendas. AHFHR’s relationship with the 
rest of those organizations is a very good one. They issue reports and cover news 
under one auspice. AHFHR does not have any conflicts with other human rights 
organizations. It does not seek to compete with other organizations, however; 
AHFHR seeks to complete the overall job of supporting human rights in Egypt. 
 
5.1.9. Sources of funding 
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights is based on personal private funding. 
However, lately the foundation has been communicating with aid institutions for 
external funding. The foundation initially refused to accept any foreign funding 
because of the suspicion of foreign intervention and foreign agendas. However, 
relying on private funding established that there cannot be assured sustainability in 
any of the projects executed. This led the foundation to start drafting proposals for 
reputable aid institutions to fund its programs.  
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Table 1: Summary of AHFHR's Case Profile 
 AHFHR 
Mission Human Rights Awareness 
Reason for establishment Group Commitment  
Key turning point Arab Spring 
Stakeholders Local Communities 
Participatory Approach In practice 
Members’ role Decision making and implementation 
Executive Committee 4 members 
Internal governance Low leadership/no clear division of 
authorities 
Decision-making process Agreement and consensus 
Transparency Members’ access and internal reporting 
Gender representation in leadership Male 
Human resources Project-based and volunteers 
Professional expertise External 
Type of activities Awareness and projects 
Needs assessment Local needs 
Relationship with state government Limited complementarity  
Relationship with donors New/Formal/Necessary/Negotiative 
Relationship with other NGOs Strong/Stable 
Relationship with media Activities’ reporting 
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5.2. Findings 
The extent to which the association of Arab House Foundation for Human Rights 
succeeded in achieving its objectives or not, can only be determined by looking at the 
outcomes and results of the projects and activities executed by the foundation. 
Throughout my internship, I realized that the association gave much more than it 
received. In other words, the association provided much by way of news coverage 
throughout the three months of my internship by giving news of human rights on its 
webpage. Hence, the web-page of the foundation was successful enough to cover 
news from a non-biased approach; however, it was not very successful in reaching out 
to all citizens who do not have access to the association’s page. At the same time, the 
mainstream media did not normally cover the successful other activities by AHFHR. 
 
As for these, which included workshops and training sessions, the association brought 
prominent figures and experts on human rights to give sessions in Cairo and other 
governorates in Egypt. Those sessions were very organized and beneficial and 
attracted a number of participants. However, as they did not offer anything but 
knowledge, the foundation had difficulty in attracting large numbers of members of 
the community. 
 
AHFHR could have been more successful had it received funds to create projects and 
activities on a larger scale. Those projects are too good to be done only once or heard 
of only by a few. Media coverage of those projects could have led to awareness 
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among a larger number of members of the community. One project that proved to be 
very successful was “Preparing a new generation to become human rights activists”. 
This project was intended to prepare the candidates that volunteered to lead future 
projects. Several news channels and online pages covered this project. It also attracted 
the attention of several members of the community. 
 
There is no doubt that AHFHR is facing serious challenges. From an objective 
perspective, the foundation has difficulty in growing or becoming one of the more 
prominent Egyptian human rights associations for the following reasons: 
 
5.2.1. Challenge #1: The question of funding 
The number one challenge without doubt is funding. For any organization to grow, it 
needs financial resources flowing into the organization. However, being a non-profit 
organization based on personal funding, AHFHR finds it very hard to create any 
sustainability or even enlarge its ongoing projects. 
 
5.2.2. Challenge #2: Timely administrative procedures 
The administrative procedures take far too much time and energy. For every activity, 
a lot of time is wasted while waiting for a certain signature or specific paper work 
needed for the execution of the activity. During this lost time, the organization’s 
projects are seriously hindered. 
 
5.2.3. Challenge #3: Timely security approvals 
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Another challenge is the time lost in security approvals. The bureaucratic procedures 
needed for every project are very time consuming. This lost time also hinders the 
organization’s pace towards achieving its plans and activities in a timely manner. 
 
5.2.4. Challenge #4: Difficulty in finding volunteers 
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights relies to a great extent on volunteers. Just 
like any other organization, finding volunteers is not an easy task particularly if the 
organization is still a newly established one. Thus, AHFHR has a hard time finding 
volunteers ready to commit to fulfilling the tasks of the organization as well as to 
travelling around the governorates of Egypt. 
 
 
Throughout the last days of my internship, I came to the most important finding of 
all. During the final stage of my internship, everything changed when I started 
helping the upper council to write proposals to be submitted to aid agencies to request 
funding for the NGO. At that time, the organization was facing financial problems 
and was starting to feel that it could not rely anymore on private funding. The 
AHFHR, then, had decided to work on a proposal calling for funding from 
international donors. The NGO was advised that the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) was accepting proposals. The Upper Council immediately 
started working on drafting a proposal on one of the projects that had not been 
completed due to lack of resources. 
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AHFHR was initially working on a project enhancing higher education capacity in 
Egypt. Throughout the year 2013, UNDP’s priority theme for funding was 
‘responsive institutions’. This description perfectly applied to the NGO’s proposed 
project. However, the UNDP suddenly shifted its priority areas to favor ‘democratic 
governance’ and ‘gender equality’. When donors offered a novel source of funding 
that attracted the attention of numerous NGOs, AHFHR was encouraged to undergo 
organizational changes, in order to develop potentially eligible projects and also to 
communicate with officials distributing the grants to access information helpful in 
acquiring funding. 
 
In order to survive, the AHFHR, correspondingly, shifted its behavior into ‘adjusting’ 
its project to fit with the new priorities of the UNDP. Later, the NGO contacted other 
donors with the same priority areas: the National Endowment Fund (NED) and the 
United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF).  (see Appendix B & Appendix C). 
The major drawback, however, is that when AHFHR adapted its agenda to the 
priorities of donor programs, it led the organization to abandon its initial aims and 
field of activity. 
 
 
5.3. Reflection and analysis 
Sadly, the Arab House Foundation for Human Rights probably lacks the means to 
ensure the sustainability of the projects. The range of activities undertaken by the 
NGO requires economic capital and trained personnel. The lack of both will not allow 
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the projects to continue on their own. For the first nine months of its existence, the 
NGO functioned within clearly defined limits. However, once the environment 
altered, the foundation changed its goal in order to meet the new expectations of 
donors. In doing so, the NGO shifted its projects, scope of work and target group. It 
may well also have become largely irrelevant to its original purpose. 
 
AHFHR abandoned its role towards its primary stakeholders. The team became 
incapable of fulfilling their responsibilities. The organization starting proposing 
projects that were not of high priority to residents of those unprivileged areas. This 
abandonment of the community’s needs and priorities led to a huge disappointment 
accompanied by mistrust towards the NGO. This vulnerable group of people lost any 
hope they had towards the future. However, because the NGO was on the verge of 
collapsing it shifted its behavior and changed its objectives. 
 
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights’ new objective changed to spreading 
awareness in the new path towards democracy so that every citizen could participate 
and know that their voices can and will be heard. The new objective of the NGO 
meant that their new focus is not basic human rights anymore. While the AHFHR did 
not undergo a paradigm shift, however, they integrated their original objectives with 
the greater goals of the donor. While on paper, this was not considered an enormous 
shift; it led to the abandonment of the basic needs of the local community while 
prioritizing the interest of the donor. Furthermore, their target group is no longer the 
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least privileged areas governorates either. The immediate objectives of the NGO 
became: 
 Teaching citizens about their human rights and how can they protect it. 
 Acting as a further stepping stone towards democratic development in Egypt. 
 Spread political awareness among a larger group of the community. 
 Stressing the importance of freedom of thought and expression. 
 Providing support for journalists who are trying to provide citizens with the 
reality of the situation in Egypt. 
 Enabling political participation of women. 
This shift in behavior and objectives constitutes an application of Hirschman’s ‘Exit, 
voice, and loyalty’ model.  
 
5.3.1. A behavioral shift 
 
The previous section in this chapter highlights the main findings during my internship 
at the Arab House Foundation for Human Rights in 2013; the reasons that led me to 
investigate why organizations behave the way they do. The time I spent at the 
AHFHR allowed me to see the point where organizations will switch behavior the 
minute they feel threatened to survive. What organizations might not admit to the 
public, I was in a place where information about the NGO could not be hidden. 
During my internship I was inside a real life experience of an organization shifting 
behavior in order to fit with donor priorities in return for resources.  
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AHFHR was designed to take local priorities into account. Selecting the parties to 
receive NGO assistance was based on identifying the most deprived groups in 
underprivileged governorates in Egypt. The NGO was based on the idea of improving 
their living conditions through awareness programs to teach them about their rights 
and how to call for them. Furthermore, the NGO’s program of establishing a new 
generation of human rights activists promised a lot of job vacancies since the people 
who are attending those workshops were supposed to work in their governorate in the 
following year. The plan was to provide a sustainable project, run later by the 
beneficiaries themselves who have acquired the highest level of attendance to the 
workshops in the entire year where the project is implemented.  The NGO was 
expected to leave more responsibilities to the primary stakeholders to make them feel 
more involved. The NGO was supposed to mobilize their members to work in the 
projects to gain appreciation and credibility in their local community. Hence, the 
outcome of this project would have led to supporting a long-term local recreation in 
this community. It was expected to enhance broader participation every year that 
could have changed people’s lives. Unfortunately, due to lack of resources, the NGO 
had to shift its behavior and projects. 
 
 
The following section concentrates on the developments that occurred in the 
foundation over the past two years. Since the end of my internship, I have been 
following the behavioral shift that the AHFHR has been going through. It began with 
a public announcement by the executive director of the Arab House Foundation for 
Human rights to “Sada El-Balad”. (Othman, 2014). He, openly, denounced the attack 
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on foreign funding stressing that foreign funding does not cause any harm (something 
the organization was against initially). He mentioned that with over 40,000 
organizations in Egypt, only 450 organizations are receiving external funding 
according to the Ministry of Social Solidarity. (Othman, 2014). Furthermore, in his 
announcement, he addressed the government on its role in getting involved and 
communicating with foreign donors to expand their grants to reach a larger number of 
NGOs in Egypt. His announcement was only a beginning to the NGO’s behavioral 
shift. 
 
In 2014, the NGO started working on programs and drafting proposals focusing on 
democratic transitions and youth encouragement. Leaving their original target group 
in the least privileged governorates led to deterioration in all the past projects that the 
AHFHR was initially working on. Projects related to preparing a new generation of 
human rights activists, enhancing the education capacity in poor areas, and the 
awareness programs about human rights had no more resources to continue. Being a 
resource dependent NGO, the AHFHR had no option but to work on the popular 
projects that were actually receiving funds. In 2014, donors like NED, UNDP, and 
UNDEF were all focusing their grants on projects related to democratic transition in 
the Middle East and youth encouragement. Consequently, the AHFHR shifted not 
only their objectives, but their behavior as well. This shift resulted in donor 
acceptance of the new projects by the AHFHR. 
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In 2015, there was another shift in the NGO’s behavior based on a shift in donor 
priorities. Donors shifted their focus towards projects related to women 
empowerment and gender equality. Hence, in 2015, the AHFHR started working on a 
project related to risks and abuses faced by women in Egypt, and how they can 
overcome them. 
 
The shift of donor priorities is due to the fact that they no longer need so many NGOs 
pushing for transitional democracy. Instead, the focus shifted to women 
empowerment as an element perceived as required in the Middle East by foreign 
donors. The immediate effect of every shift by foreign donors is that numerous 
programs initiated by NGOs in Egypt become abandoned. AHFHR, like many other 
NGOs, find itself at the mercy of the agendas and priorities of foreign donors. The 
grass-roots issues addressed by local NGOs in Egypt often do not correlate with the 
international issues upon which their funding is based, and this incompatibility 
creates uncertainty for many programs. Unfortunately, students who may have had a 
better chance in getting educated and youth who could have become better 
individuals aware of their rights in very remote areas have failed to receive any 
tangible benefit after this behavioral shift. 
AHFHR already face an uphill battle with a lack of resources and experience. The 
current process for providing developmental assistance lacks long-term sustainability 
because funding priorities are not always in accord with local needs and programming 
cycles. The insecurity brought about by shifting foreign agendas is just one more 
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challenge for the NGO. More importantly, it is one more barrier preventing it from 
improving the standard of living for its community. 
The events that occurred in the recent years have shifted the focus of foreign donors 
as the development budget is tied to national interest. Once again this is what 
eventually leads to the abandonment of programs, leaving many communities to fend 
for themselves. The cycle of short-term projects and insecurity for NGOs, who are 
reliant on foreign funding, continues. 
 
5.3.2. Explaining behavior according to Hirschman 
 
The question of how NGOs in developing countries react to shifts in donor agencies’ 
funding is applicable to the case of the Arab House foundation for Human rights.  
When the National Endowment for Democracy accepted the AHFHR’s project on 
youth empowerment in the process of democratic transition in 2014, the organization 
became resource dependent on NED. All their work during that year was focused on 
the role of youth under the new regime in Egypt. However, when NED shifted its 
priority the following year to women empowerment, AHFHR started re-evaluating its 
agenda, again, due to concerns regarding the future prospects for donor support. 
Consequently, the NGO started preparing new eligible projects on women 
empowerment in order to match donor priorities. 
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Due to funding concerns, AHFHR while working under the same umbrella of human 
rights, shifted its approach more than once towards projects that of priority to the 
donor rather than of priority to the local community. Emerging funding trends 
suggested that NGOs could increase sustainability by seeking financial and technical 
support from donors on the condition of prioritizing their interests in the region. 
 
According to Hirschman, the NGO is this case clearly chose the ‘loyalty’ option as a 
mode of behavior. As mentioned previously, ‘loyalty’ in this paradigm means 
adjustment. When an NGO has no other alternative to allocate resources, it does not 
have the privilege to ‘voice’ or ‘exit’. In seeking survival, the NGO’s only choice was 
to alter and modify its objectives to fit with donor priorities. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The acquisition and sustainability of financial resources continue to be paramount 
challenges for non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Contrary to other institutions, 
which rely on generating profits from selling products or services, NGOs seek financial 
resources mainly from international donors. However, due to continuous fluctuations, 
receiving international funds is not promised. This case study establishes that since 
NGOs’ survival may rely on these funds, their performances will not only take donors’ 
interests into consideration but often even prioritize them. Hence, resource allocation has 
possibly become the major determinant of NGO behavior and decisions. 
Research on NGOs has established that resource dependence theory does much to explain 
the relationship between donor funding and NGO behavior. Resource dependence theory 
suggests that the form of behavior of an NGO is a reflection of its dependence on an 
external actor for resources. The level of resource dependence affects, and possibly 
determines, the behavior of the NGO. 
The relationship between resource dependence and an NGO’s decision to shift its 
behavior can also be explained through Hirschman’s ‘exit, voice, and loyalty’ model. The 
higher the resource dependence of an organization, the more likely it will practice the 
‘loyalty’ concept. However, the lower the resource dependence of an organization, the 
more likely it will practice the ‘voice’ or ‘exit’ options. In other words, when the NGO 
has various alternative options to allocate resources, it will tend to be less controlled by 
the donor. Conversely, the more loyal and dependent the NGO is on certain donors, the 
more their behavior will always be along the lines of prioritizing donor interests. 
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My contribution to scholarly debates on NGO-donor relations is not focused on labeling 
NGOs or donors as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Instead, it is an attempt to understand NGO behavior. 
Regardless of their success or failure, there is an unhealthy relationship between donors 
and NGOs. It is a realist world where all actors will seek self-interest. The developmental 
problem here is that NGOs are the closest institution to local communities. It is the 
institution that best understand their needs. How can communities develop when their 
closest ally is prioritizing donor interests rather than community interests? 
NGOs are caught in the dependency trap. Since NGOs are resource insufficient, the fate 
of their local communities will usually be in the hands of the donor. Donors who live in 
different communities and have different interests dictate what kind of projects NGOs 
can work on. Consequently, most resource dependent NGOs are choosing overlapping 
projects while neglecting crucial projects that could be more essential to the local 
community. In order to survive, NGOs will shift their behavior in order to sustain donor 
funding rather than responding to people’s needs. 
The case of Egyptian NGOs is only an illustration of the NGO-donor relationship in 
developing countries in general. NGOs in Egypt after the 25 January revolution have 
experienced a dependency trap. The lack of government resources led NGOs to pursue 
foreign funding. The more dependent the NGO is, the higher the probability that it will 
shift interests in accordance with donor priorities. Local needs of people are not being 
addressed because if their problem is not already on the donor agenda then it does not 
become a priority. 
The case of the Arab House Foundation for Human Rights focuses on how NGOs 
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respond to changes in their environment, specifically how they react to shifts in donor 
funding. NGOs are increasingly replacing government agencies as providers of social 
services, yet they often rely on private donors for funding. As a result, NGOs may 
experience a tension between upward and downward accountability. On the one hand, 
NGOs are accountable to the community they serve. On the other hand, to the extent that 
they depend on external funding, NGOs are also accountable to their donors. This case, 
while faces several limitations, supports the hypothesis by touching upon the tension 
between upward and downward accountability, reaching the point where NGOs’ resource 
dependence will result in shifting priorities to align with donor interests.  
The question, “why do NGOs adopt perspectives and priorities derived from funding 
sources”, has essentially been answered throughout the foregoing pages.  The answer 
itself boils down to a distilled awareness that Human Rights-focused NGOs involve only 
small numerical percentages of the populations of Third World societies, that awareness 
of Human Rights issues is limited in such contexts, that Human Rights issues may be 
very divisive questions in many Third World contexts, and that funding remains 
problematical for many, if not most, Human Rights-Focused NGOs in the Third World.  
In short, then, the answer to the research question raised above is that the combination of 
real material needs to work on behalf of Human Rights and an equally real lack of 
material means to accomplish this goal combine to pressure Human Rights-focused 
NGOs to adopt perspectives and priorities derived from funding sources.  
 
Derivative sub-questions can now also be addressed: 
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 To what extent does resource dependence theory help explain today’s 
relationships between NGOs and donors?  I would say to “a great extent”. 
 Why are international donors the major contributors of NGO funding rather than 
state agencies? I would suggest that impressionistic evidence from the Egyptian 
scene suggests that human rights issues are divisive in the Third World; so 
international funding is an attractive option. 
 What impact does donors’ decision to change their funding priorities have on 
NGO’s established priorities?  The evidence from the case study suggests the 
answer to this would be: NGOs tend to modify their own priorities in order to 
remain compatible with those of funding agencies. 
 
Recommendations 
Donors should revisit their funding strategies and mechanisms. They ought to 
relax the conditionality of funding and be more inclusive in tackling development 
projects. If donors want to see NGOs make a real change in people’s lives, they 
will have to let the NGO work since NGOs are more aware of what local 
communities need. Nevertheless, NGOs have the bigger role in overcoming the 
complications in the NGO-donor relationship. NGOs should include donor 
interests but not prioritize it. Whenever donor interests are not parallel to the 
needs of the target group, NGOs have to practice the ‘voice’ option and say ‘no’. 
NGOs should empower themselves through a powerful vision. Only then can an 
NGO resist shifting its performance and commit to its original objectives. NGOs 
and donors are responsible for finding a way where not only both can benefit, but 
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more importantly the beneficiaries that they have responsibility towards. 
 
Limitations  
 This research focus on the behavior of an NGO in real setting, however, it is 
based on only three months of observation. 
 While qualitatively rich, this research lacks a quantitative significance. There is 
only one case study in this research due to the difficulty of interviewing other 
NGOs and expecting them to give similar information. It is hard for NGOs to 
admit that they are prioritizing donor interest because they need resources. 
 The research does not extensively go into detail about the reason behind donors’ 
shifts in projects and changing priority areas. 
 The research was limited to NGOs in developing countries. NGOs in developed 
countries may not face similar situations. 
 
I consider both the findings and the limitations of the research to be potential 
opportunities for future research and examination.  
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APPENDIX A: TRAINING CERTIFICATE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights 
 
Date: 19/11/2013 
 
To whom it may concern, 
 
This is to certify that Miss Rana Reda El Gawish, a graduate student in the 
Faculty of Political Science at the American University in Cairo (Major in 
Development) has successfully completed three months long internship 
(from July 1st 2013 to September 30th 2013). During the period of her 
internship, she was found punctual, strict to deadlines, hardworking, team 
player, and had excellent analytical skills.  
 
We wish her every success in life. 
 
 
EHAB RADY 
 
Authorized Signature 
 
 
 
 
Facebook page: 
https://www.facebook.com/ArabHouseFoundationForHumanRights?ref=ts&fref=ts#!/Ar
abHouseFoundationForHumanRights 
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APPENDIX B: PROJECT PROPOSAL 
 
 
 
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY 
PROJECT PROPOSAL 
1. SUMMARY 
Decentralization is one of the reforms that states need to adopt to recover from oppressive 
authoritarian regimes and move to a democratic governance regime. The road is not easy 
and the milestones need to be met. This project arises out of a new constitutional 
framework that prioritizes women and youth. Its main aim is to enhance their ultimate 
participation in the political life. This project is taking place during the transitional period 
that Egypt is going through. This period requires the investment of all range of societal 
factions, in particular the marginalized and incapable groups, to enhance their political 
participation. 
Egypt now is experiencing a transitional period from a highly centralized state to a 
decentralized one. After the constitutional referendum, it is estimated that 50% of the 
Local People’s Councils seats will be for women and youth. Accordingly, this project is 
significant as it aims to empower the youth and women, particularly in marginalized 
areas in governorates, to establish Local People’s Councils that fights corruption. This 
will only be attained through active members who are well aware of their responsibilities 
and duties. The project will achieve its objectives through studies, training, and 
monitoring members during the local elections. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
Egyptian youth identified the root cause of all their problems through lacking their 
political rights through today’s democratic governance systems prevailing in democratic 
countries. The corrupt institutions and the elite dominating political life with no hope of 
alternation of power caused Egypt’s economic and political problems. They also realized 
that the corrupt government is incapable of delivering public services to its people and is 
a root cause for the lack of equal opportunity. 
 
Democratic transition in Egypt has faced several impediments which led people today to 
lose their hope and belief in a democratic rule to occur. The new drafted constitution, 
however, provides a significant importance to localities through the Local People’s 
councils. Those councils are the only way towards true representation. Citizens have a 
chance where their voice could be heard, where their voice can actually matter. The most 
important question is how can we ensure that those localities will neither be corrupt nor 
insignificant? The proposed project, thus, creates a chance for those localities to make a 
difference in people’s lives. Those localities will only function correctly if the citizens are 
empowered. The project’s target group is the youth and women as they make up about 
50% of the new law for localities. The organization seeks to target youth and women in 
the most marginalized areas in the state. Those people are the key towards a true 
representation in localities if they become aware of their rights and knew how to call for 
it. 
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3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
 An assessment on citizens’ problems and their needs from the local councils.  
 Drafting a new law for local people’s councils.  
 Awareness program  
 Providing trainings for marginalized youth and women  
 
  4. PROJECT ACTIVITIES    
Objective 1: 
 An assessment on citizens’ problems and their needs from the local councils. 
Relevant Activities: 
o Surveys 
 Research team to put a plan and expert to analyze and create 
recommendations 
 Workshop: to evaluate the results and how to use it (with the 
attendance of the ministry and parliament representatives). 
 
Objective 2:  
 Drafting a new law for local people’s councils 
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There is a problem in the law that has been continuing for years. Hence of the activities 
of the project is lobbying for a new draft law that calls for decentralization, transparency, 
accountability, fighting corruption, and supports the youth with consideration that the 
new drafted constitution states that 50% of the seats in the localities is for youth and 
women. In addition, the current law from 1979 has not changed up till today. 
Relevant activities: 
o Experts committee for preparing a draft of the new law for local people’s 
councils which aims to issue a new project law that ensures achieving the 
objectives. 
o Community discussions to all range of all political streams and classes 
(civil society, parties, sects) about the draft law. 
o Interviews and meeting with decision makers, government, and minister 
for local development. 
o Suggest a final draft to the law to give it to the government and decision 
makers to pressure its issuing. Pressure can also be through the parliament 
to enforce this new drafted law.  
o After its acceptance, 
 Create awareness programs 
 Provide training for members of Local People’s Councils. 
 Provide training for target groups (women, youth, civil society, 
youth members of parties) in 27 governorates through the seven 
provinces. Ex: El delta province, canal cities province, South 
Upper Egypt province. 
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Objective 3: 
 Awareness program 
Relevant Activities: 
o Production of media and art works through caricatures and promos in the 
social media and television from 1 to 10 minutes maximum. This aims to 
spread awareness and simplify the information and ease its delivery to all 
range of society (vulnerable and illiterate in villages and distanced areas). 
 These works will be used in training programs and workshops, as 
well as publishing them in the social media and television. 
o Establish a newsletter that aims to illustrate the project‘s importance and 
its outputs. 
 Communications tool with the target group to publish the 
aforementioned arts works. 
o Create brochures to illustrate the project team and the objectives of this 
project to be distributed on the target group and beneficiaries. 
o Public meetings with the target group to spread awareness about the 
importance of participation in the elections of the local councils.  
Objective 4: 
 Providing trainings for marginalized youth and women 
Relevant Activities: 
Two types of trainings: 
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1. Training possible candidates to become: active, aware, skilled to 
perform all tasks relevant to people’s needs. 
2. Training sessions to team to spread awareness amongst people in 
coordination with civil societies in the targeted areas. 
 
5. EVALUATION PLAN 
 The project will be monitored on regular basis by the project management team to 
ensure that all activities are taking place as scheduled and with high quality.  
 Every six months, external experts will be invited to evaluate the performance of 
the project. Furthermore, it is important that they give recommendations on how 
to correct any irregularities.  
 Trained groups should create entities to evaluate the performance of the Local 
People’s Councils after the project ends.    
6. INTERIM ASSESSMENT    
NA    
7. ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND    
AHFHR has started an array of projects and activities related to the current situation in 
Egypt. Therefore, throughout the past months, the main focus of the association has been 
democratic transition in Egypt.   When planning for and organizing workshops and 
trainings, the organization has brought prominent figures and experts on human rights 
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and democracy to give sessions in Cairo and more marginalized groups in other 
governorates in Egypt. Those sessions were very organized and beneficial and attracted a 
lot of civilians. The numbers of attendees started increasing one project after another due 
to current misunderstandings people have due to biased media channels and newspapers.  
One project that is proving to be very successful is “Preparing a new generation to 
become human rights activists”. This project is intended to prepare the candidates who 
volunteered in the project to rely on them in future projects. This project has been lately 
covered by several news channels and online pages. It had also attracted several members 
of the community, and are being very well trained by experts on human rights and 
democracy. Another projects executed this year were the “New Labor Law draft” project 
and the “Constitutional awareness” project. 
Other funding: 
None 
References: 
 Mr. Hafez Abu Seada (Director of Egyptian Organization for Human Rights), Contact 
info: 01222188309, E-mail: hafez@abuseada.com  
 Mr. Negad El Borai (Director of United Group), Contact info: 01222129637, E-mail: 
negad@ug-law.com  
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1. Applicant Information 
Organization’s name: Arab House Foundation for Human Rights 
Organization Acronym: AHFHR 
Type of Applicant: NGO 
First time or prior applicant: First time 
Head 
 Prefix: Mr. 
 Name: Ehab Rady 
 Title: Chairman of the board of trustees 
 Phone: 01224001969 
 E-mail: Ehap_rady@yahoo.com 
 Website: https://www.facebook.com/#!/ArabHouseFoundationForHumanRights 
Address of the organization: 4 Ahmed Maher Buildings, Bab El-Khalk, 
Downtown. Ciaro 
Key contact 
 Name: Rana Gawish 
 Title: Project Coordinator 
 Phone: 01011000610 
E-mail: ranagawish@hotmail.com 
 Address: 2 El Obour Buildings, Salah Salem st., Heliopolis. Cairo 
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Prior Experience of the organization: 
 
AHFHR has started an array of projects and activities related to the current situation in 
Egypt. Therefore, throughout the past months, the main focus of the association has been 
democratic transition in Egypt. 
 
When planning for and organizing workshops and trainings, the organization has brought 
prominent figures and experts on human rights and democracy to give sessions in Cairo 
and more marginalized groups in other governorates in Egypt. Those sessions were very 
organized and beneficial and attracted a lot of civilians. The numbers of attendees started 
increasing one project after another due to current misunderstandings people have due to 
biased media channels and newspapers. 
 
One project that is proving to be very successful is “Preparing a new generation to 
become human rights activists”. This project is intended to prepare the candidates who 
volunteered in the project to rely on them in future projects. This project has been lately 
covered by several news channels and online pages. It had also attracted several members 
of the community, and are being very well trained by experts on human rights and 
democracy. Another projects executed this year were the “New Labor Law draft” project 
and the “Constitutional awareness” project.  
 
Operational budget: 80,000$ 
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Prior experience with the UN: 
The organization has no prior experience with the United Nations, but it is looking 
forward to build relations with the UN in regards to achieving mutual goals by combining 
our efforts. 
 
Affiliation with other associations or organizations: 
The Arab House Foundation for Human Rights is part of a congregation of 76 human 
rights organizations in Egypt. Almost 40 of those associations- including AHFHR- have a 
very strong bond due to their similar agendas and more importantly, their similar political 
affiliation. AHFHR’s relationship with the rest of those organizations is a very good one. 
They issue reports and cover news under one auspice 
 
2. Project Information 
Project title: Youth and Women Empowerment: The importance of local representation 
Project location: Egypt, all governorates 
Project Summary: 
Decentralization is one of the reforms that states need to adopt to recover from oppressive 
authoritarian regimes and move to a democratic governance regime. The road is not easy 
and the milestones need to be met. This project arises out of a new constitutional 
framework that prioritizes women and youth. Its main aim is to enhance their ultimate 
participation in the political life. This two year project is taking place during the 
transitional period that Egypt is going through. This period requires the investment of all 
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range of societal factions, in particular the marginalized and incapable groups, to enhance 
their political participation. 
 
Egypt now is experiencing a transitional period from a highly centralized state to a 
decentralized one. After the constitutional referendum, it is estimated that 50% of the 
Local People’s Councils seats will be for women and youth. Accordingly, this project is 
significant as it aims to empower the youth and women, particularly in marginalized 
areas in governorates, to establish Local People’s Councils that fights corruption. This 
will only be attained through active members who are well aware of their responsibilities 
and duties. The project will achieve its objectives through studies, training, and 
monitoring members during the local elections. 
 
Requested grant amount: 250,000 $ 
 
Applicants own contribution (cash/in-kind): 
Contribution will in-kind. It will be through planning and organizing, consultating, and 
managing. 
 
Main feature of the project: Civil society empowerment, including women. 
 
Gender considerations: 
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This project is very gender sensitive. One of the target groups of the project is women. 
The project seeks to empower women and teach them the importance of their 
participation. 
 
Marginalized or vulnerable groups: 
 
This project targets the most marginalized groups in the state. It seeks to empower the 
most vulnerable groups in all 27 governorates and let them know their rights and how to 
call for it. It puts them on the road to become active citizens. 
 
3. Project Description 
 
Problem: 
 
Egyptian youth identified the root cause of all their problems through lacking their 
political rights through today’s democratic governance systems prevailing in democratic 
countries. The corrupt institutions and the elite dominating political life with no hope of 
alternation of power caused Egypt’s economic and political problems. They also realized 
that the corrupt government is incapable of delivering public services to its people and is 
a root cause for the lack of equal opportunity. 
 
Democratic transition in Egypt has faced several impediments which led people today to 
lose their hope and belief in a democratic rule to occur. The new drafted constitution, 
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however, provides a significant importance to localities through the Local People’s 
councils. Those councils are the only way towards true representation. Citizens have a 
chance where their voice could be heard, where their voice can actually matter. The most 
important question is how can we ensure that those localities will neither be corrupt nor 
insignificant? The proposed project, thus, creates a chance for those localities to make a 
difference in people’s lives. Those localities will only function correctly if the citizens are 
empowered. The project’s target group is the youth and women as they make up about 
50% of the new law for localities. The organization seeks to target youth and women in 
the most marginalized areas in the state. Those people are the key towards a true 
representation in localities if they become aware of their rights and knew how to call for 
it. 
 
Objectives: 
 An assessment on citizens’ problems and their needs from the local councils. 
 Drafting a new law for local people’s councils. 
 Awareness program 
 Providing trainings for marginalized youth and women 
 
Key activities: 
 
Objective 1: 
 An assessment on citizens’ problems and their needs from the local councils. 
Relevant Activities: 
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o Surveys 
 Research team to put a plan and expert to analyze and create 
recommendations 
 Workshop: to evaluate the results and how to use it (with the 
attendance of the ministry and parliament representatives). 
 
Objective 2:  
 Drafting a new law for local people’s councils 
There is a problem in the law that has been continuing for years. Hence of the activities 
of the project is lobbying for a new draft law that calls for decentralization, transparency, 
accountability, fighting corruption, and supports the youth with consideration that the 
new drafted constitution states that 50% of the seats in the localities is for youth and 
women. In addition, the current law from 1979 has not changed up till today. 
Relevant activities: 
o Experts committee for preparing a draft of the new law for local people’s 
councils which aims to issue a new project law that ensures achieving the 
objectives. 
o Community discussions to all range of all political streams and classes 
(civil society, parties, sects) about the draft law. 
o Interviews and meeting with decision makers, government, and minister 
for local development. 
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o Suggest a final draft to the law to give it to the government and decision 
makers to pressure its issuing. Pressure can also be through the parliament 
to enforce this new drafted law.  
o After its acceptance, 
 Create awareness programs 
 Provide training for members of Local People’s Councils. 
 Provide training for target groups (women, youth, civil society, 
youth members of parties) in 27 governorates through the seven 
provinces. Ex: El delta province, canal cities province, South 
Upper Egypt province. 
Objective 3: 
 Awareness program 
Relevant Activities: 
o Production of media and art works through caricatures and promos in the 
social media and television from 1 to 10 minutes maximum. This aims to 
spread awareness and simplify the information and ease its delivery to all 
range of society (vulnerable and illiterate in villages and distanced areas). 
 These works will be used in training programs and workshops, as 
well as publishing them in the social media and television. 
o Establish a newsletter that aims to illustrate the project‘s importance and 
its outputs. 
 Communications tool with the target group to publish the 
aforementioned arts works. 
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o Create brochures to illustrate the project team and the objectives of this 
project to be distributed on the target group and beneficiaries. 
o Public meetings with the target group to spread awareness about the 
importance of participation in the elections of the local councils.  
Objective 4: 
 Providing trainings for marginalized youth and women 
Relevant Activities: 
Two types of trainings: 
3. Training possible candidates to become: active, aware, skilled to 
perform all tasks relevant to people’s needs. 
4. Training sessions to team to spread awareness amongst people in 
coordination with civil societies in the targeted areas. 
 
Outputs: 
 Awareness: 30 public meetings in villages and marginalized areas in the 
governorates targeting 2700 citizen. 
 Two types of trainings should lead to: 
1) Possible candidates. Choose 15 from every governorate (27 governorates) 
which means that the project targets 405 possible candidates to run in the 
elections in the Local People’s Councils. 
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2) Training the youth to spread awareness through public meetings in the 
governorate (10 from every governorate) to ensure sustainability and can later 
monitor the Local People’s Councils. 
 
Results/outcomes: 
1) Changing the law. 
2) Awareness leading people towards more participation in elections. 
3) Cadre of 405 qualified candidates to participate in Local People’s Councils. 
 
Monitoring and evaluation: 
 The project will be monitored on regular basis by the project management team to 
ensure that all activities are taking place as scheduled and with high quality. 
 Every six months, external expert will be invited to evaluate the performance of 
the project. Furthermore, it is important that they give recommendations on how 
to correct any irregularities. 
 Trained groups should create entities to evaluate the performance of the Local 
People’s Councils after the project ends.  
 
Innovation: 
 Drafting a new law 
 Awareness through arts and media to simplify information. 
 Youth monitoring to Local People’s Councils post the end of the project. 
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Sustainability: 
 Use trained groups to create entities to ensure the sustainability and continuation 
of the project.  
 Community welfare will be regarded as crucial to improve people’s living 
standards because their better quality of life will be enhanced only through those 
localities.  
 
Why UNDEF: 
UNDEF’s main concentrations are exactly what this project needs. Strengthening the 
civil society, promotion of human rights, encouraging participation of all groups, 
community development, youth and women empowerment, and media, are all elements 
that the project borrows from the mission of UNDEF. Hence, there is no better institution 
to fit such project for not only funding, but also evaluation and recommendations.  
 
4. Partner Information 
Proposed executing agency: -  
Specify Local Office of Executing Agency:- 
Name of contact person:- 
Position- 
E-mail:- 
Phone Number:- 
Partner: National Council for Research and Consultancy. 
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NCRC offers a unique portfolio of programs for senior public service policy makers and 
managers, parliamentarians, media representatives and people from NGOs worldwide. 
Their programs are designed to provide participants with insights into many facets of the 
Egyptian evolving public administration agenda. They feature visits to central and local 
government departments and agencies, related public sector organizations, parliament, 
the media, NGOs and private sector bodies.  They provide an ideal opportunity for the 
exchange of information and ideas between public service representatives from around 
the world with each other and with their counterparts in the Egypt. 
 
Other donors or sponsors: - 
 
5. Budget 
Budget by activity 
Activity description Amount in US$ 
Workshops targeted at local youth and 
women 
60,000 
Community discussions and public 
meetings 
15,000 
Production of art and media works targeted 
at empowering youth and women 
35,000 
Development of advocacy/outreach 
materials 
25,000 
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(surveys, brochures, newsletter) 
Training sessions targeted at local youth 
and women in governorates around the 
country 
90,000 
Total project cost 225,000 
Monitoring and evaluation 25,000 
Total requested grant amount 250,000 
 
Budget by input 
Activity description Amount in US$ 
Salaries 
(Professional project personnel (national 
and international employees) and 
consultants. Administrative personnel and 
all other staff costs for general project 
management.) 
40,000 
Travel 
(Travel and per diem (meals and 
accommodation) for project management 
team. 
20,000 
Contractual Services 
(Commercial services, translation, 
providers, etc.) 
3,000 
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Workshops, meetings, seminars 
(rental of premises, refreshments, banners, 
public address systems, interpretation, 
travel, hotels and meals, resources, 
including human resources) 
110,000 
Study tours 
(travel, hotels and meals, resources, 
including human resources) 
0 
Project equipments 
(IT equipment, project support equipment 
e.g. TV, radio equipment, printer) 
5,000 
Outreach 
(publications, pamphlet, brochures, print 
material, websites) 
38,000 
Miscellaneous 
(stationery, communications, postage, 
courier plus fuel, insurance, maintenance 
contracts, utilities) 
3,000 
Audit 
(certification of reports on the use of funds 
by an independent auditor/accountant) 
3,000 
Other 
(Please Specify): Gender Advisor 
3,000 
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Total project cost 225,000 
Monitoring and evaluation 25,000 
Total requested grant amount 250,000 
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